Informal settlement upgrading in the current policy context: lessons from the Civic Movement in Lebowakgomo in Limpopo Province, 1990-2000 by Sepuru, David Mmakgabo Champ
 
University of the Witwatersrand 
 
 
Faculty of Engineering and the Built Environment  
School of Architecture and Planning 
 
Student Name   : D.M.C. Sepuru 
Student No.    : 8807512K 
Degree    : MSC (Housing) 
Supervisor    : Professor Marie Huchzermeyer 
Course    : Research Report 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Research Title: Informal Settlement Upgrading in the current policy context:  
Lessons from the Civic Movement in Lebowakgomo in Limpopo Province, 
1990-2000. 
Informal Settlement upgrading in the current policy context: Lessons from the Civic 
Movement in Lebowakgomo in Limpopo Province, 1990-2000. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A research report submitted to the Faculty of Engineering and the Built Environment, 
University of the Witwatersrand, in partial fulfilment of the Degree of Master of Science 
in Housing, March 2009. 
 
 i
Declaration 
 
I declare that this research report is my own unaided work. It is submitted for partial 
fulfilment of the degree of Master of Science in Housing in the Faculty of 
Engineering and the Built Environment at the University of the Witwatersrand, 
Johannesburg. It has not been submitted before for any other degree or examination 
in any other university. 
 
 
____________ 
D.M.C. Sepuru 
 
31st day of March 2009  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 ii
 
Abstract 
The national and provincial departments of housing and local authorities can draw 
incredible lessons from the integrated approach of the Civic Movement in 
Lebowakgomo which is similar in many respects with major tenets of Chapter 13 of 
the National Housing Code in their endeavours to upgrade informal settlements in 
this country. The approach employed in this study hinges on a desktop study of grey 
and secondary literature, audio material in the form of information dissemination 
cassette complimented by the living memory of the only two respondents that I 
interviewed as well as my personal experience derived from my tenure as the 
Chairperson of the local branch of SANCO, Councillor for Ward 3, Chairperson (all 
Mayors of rural Transitional Local Councils (TLCs) were referred to as 
Chairpersons) of Greater Lebowakgomo TLC and the TLC Rep in the Northern 
District Council (NDC). These methods and procedures revealed that the Civic 
Movement approach encompassed major tenets of Chapter 13 of the National 
Housing Code, centred on concepts of urban-rural linkages, secure tenure, 
community participation and eradication of informal settlements and the people-
centred and people-driven processes. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction to the research report 
1.1 Introduction 
Urban Land invasion is a daily occurrence that accounts for the existence of informal 
settlements throughout the world. The reasons for land invasions are manifold. Chief 
among them is lack of opportunities in the rural areas coupled with high commuting costs 
to and from the work centres in urban areas. This results in rural-urban migration with the 
formation of informal settlements in close proximity to formal areas where job 
opportunities are available. In South Africa, the process of informal settlement formation 
was predominantly driven by the Civic Movement and/or individual members of the civil 
society. 
 
The mushrooming of informal settlements has become a headache for governments 
worldwide. Many governments resort to forced evictions, some just tolerate them or 
ignore them while others apply upgrading as a solution to the challenge of the escalating 
growth of informal settlements. The South African government has adopted upgrading 
and relocation of existing informal settlements as well as zero-tolerance to new invasions 
in its new housing policy as contained in Chapters 12 and 13 of the National Housing 
Code and a 2004 document entitled A Comprehensive Plan for the Development of 
Sustainable Human Settlements commonly known as Breaking New Ground (BNG). 
 
 The task of this research report is to analyse the experience of upgrading of informal 
settlements in Lebowakgomo, which occurred prior to the enactment of Chapter 13 of the 
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National Housing Code hereinafter interchangeably referred to as Chapter 13 of the Code 
or the Programme, to compare some of the key issues that were faced in that upgrading 
process and test their relevance for implementing upgrading processes in line with 
Chapter 13 of the Code. In an endeavour to accomplish this task, I will scrutinise how the 
controversial issue of eradication of informal settlements was tackled, how issues of 
urban-rural linkages impacted on tenure choice, how tenure security was addressed, and 
how community participation was conceptualised and executed by the Civic Movement 
during the period under review. To this end, I adopt an advocacy approach as a tool of 
analysis within the context of concepts of eradication of informal settlements, urban-rural 
linkages, secure tenure and community participation. 
 
1.2 Background and Problem Statement 
Although there is an extraordinary parallel and contrast between the Civic Movement 
approach to upgrading of informal settlements in Lebowakgomo hereinafter referred to as 
the Civic Movement approach and Chapter 13 of the Code, the local municipality of 
Lepelle-Nkumpi in Limpopo province has failed to draw lessons for an appropriate 
intervention from the Civic Movement approach while also failing to implement Chapter 
13 of the Code since its adoption in 2004. This makes it relevant to compare and contrast 
the two approaches. The aim of this research report is to delineate the similarities and 
differences between the informal settlement upgrading as advocated by the Civic 
Movement in Lebowakgomo from 1990 to 2000 and Chapter 13 of the Code with a view 
to draw lessons for an effective informal settlement intervention. In this comparison, I 
will assess in particular issues of urban-rural linkages, secure tenure, community 
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participation and eradication of informal settlements and how they impacted on informal 
settlement inhabitants and the environment. The aim is to broaden our understanding of 
opportunities and constraints with regards to upgrading in line with the stipulations of 
Chapter 13 of the Code. In addition, the research report seeks to avail information needed 
for appropriate and effective planning and development within the context of informal 
settlement upgrading. 
 
1.3 Research Question 
Research Question 
To what extent can Civic Movements use access to government as a strategy to influence 
the way Chapter 13 of the Housing Code is implemented and adapted to local contexts? – 
A case of Lebowakgomo in Limpopo Province. 
The answer to this research question will centre on the following sub-questions: 
 
Sub Questions 
• What were the key components and philosophy of the Civic Movement approach in 
Lebowakgomo? To what extent were they influenced by the concepts of urban-rural 
linkages, secure tenure, community participation and eradication of informal 
settlements? 
• What are the lessons that can be learnt from the Civic Movement approach in 
Lebowakgomo to unlock the potentials of Chapter 13 of the Code? 
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1.4 Hypothesis 
The answer to the main research question provides an example of where the Civic 
Movement approach to informal settlement upgrading was effective and comparable to 
Chapter 13 of the Code, a programme which virtually all municipalities in this country do 
not apply yet. This is despite the availability of various reports that were commissioned 
by the National Department of Housing (DoH) and constructive criticisms and advice 
from commentators such as Marie Huchzermeyer. Therefore, this research report will not 
only add to an existing body of knowledge but also cast light on contentious issues.  
 
The fact that there is a substantial overlap between the Civic Movement approach in 
Lebowakgomo and Chapter 13 of the Code will help us to draw lessons for a viable 
informal settlement intervention. Chief among these lessons is the fact that the 
mechanisms employed by the Civic Movement in Lebowakgomo pertaining to 
community participation will empower us in drawing a blueprint for effective community 
participation prior to, during and beyond the upgrading process.   
 
1.5 Research Method 
The research method for this study consisted of a desktop study review of secondary 
literature and grey literature. The grey literature that constituted the core of the 
documents that I used for purposes of this research report were minutes, memoranda, 
organisational reports, court papers and newspaper cuttings. Of importance is that these 
documents were informative, readily available, retrospective and affordable. The vast 
amount of these documents coupled with secondary sources on the study area covered 
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every aspect of enquiry without any gaps that needed to be filled. This was complimented 
by my recollection of observations of daily activities and experience from 1993 to 2000 
while in the leadership of the Lebowakgomo Civic Association (LCA) which was later 
transformed into the local branch of the South African National Civic Organisation 
(SANCO) as well as the Greater Lebowakgomo Transitional Local Council (TLC). 
 
My recollection of key events was boosted by the memories of the only two respondents 
who were carefully selected for open-ended interviews to emphasise specific points. Of 
the two respondents, one was the former Chairperson of the Lebowakgomo branch of the 
ANC and the other was the former Deputy Chairperson of the Lebowakgomo branch of 
SANCO, former Administrator of the Greater Lebowakgomo TLC and former member of 
the Provincial Housing Board (PHB) of the Northern Province. None of them came from 
the opposition civic organisation, i.e., the LCO for reasons that I will elaborate in the next 
sub-section of this report. 
 
As I will vividly show in the main report, the case study of Lebowakgomo during the 
period under review is relevant to informal settlement upgrading today in that the Civic 
Movement approach in Lebowakgomo comprised of ingredients that are comparable with 
Chapter 13 of the Code.  The sets of data that I collected and investigated hinged on 
concepts of urban-rural linkages, security of tenure, community participation and 
eradication of informal settlements. All of these concepts except urban-rural linkages are 
also covered in Chapter 13 of the Code. 
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1.6 Limitations of the research 
As I have already pointed out, I conducted only two carefully selected open-ended 
interviews because the grey literature on the study area was rich and adequate to militate 
against the use of interviews. Moreover, the interviews were to result in the duplication of 
existing data. It is also highly probable that my dual leadership as Chairperson of the 
local branch of SANCO and Chairperson (Mayor) of the Greater Lebowakgomo TLC 
during the period under review might have antagonised leaders and supporters of the then 
opposition Lebowakgomo Civic Organisation (LCO) to either refuse to partake in the 
interviews for attitudinal reasons or withhold sensitive information for fear of reprisals. 
In summary, interviews were going to end up being biased due to ongoing tensions. The 
limited use of interviews as part of the research methods of my case study robbed the 
research report of the richness of oral evidence. This in spite of the possibility that there 
might have been a few people within the opposition category who could have granted me 
interviews given my conflict resolution skills, which have been hailed by many people 
(including the leadership and membership of the opposition LCO) I have crossed swords 
with during my dual leadership of both the local branch of SANCO and the TLC. 
 
Further, I must acknowledge that my past and direct involvement in the leadership of the 
TLC and SANCO-affiliated LCA creates an ambivalent status between a personal and 
therefore somehow subjective narrative and an academic enquiry about the politics of 
formalisation of informal settlements and/or the dichotomies of being a civic leader and a 
government elected representative. Nevertheless, this report is still of value because of 
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the original and exceptional character of an ‘internal perspective’ on informal settlement 
upgrading and the shift from the civic to government. 
 
Given the limited time-frame at my disposal, the research could not explore issues 
specifically related to women although women constituted more than half the residents of 
informal settlements. Neither could it address issues specifically affecting other 
vulnerable groups such as HIV/AIDS victims, people with disabilities, the youth and the 
aged, nor did it present statistical analysis of the poor. Nevertheless, an effort was made, 
albeit on a piece meal basis, to give a gender sensitive perspective of how the issues 
under review affected women. In addition, although it was not part of my task to 
categorise the poor, I endeavoured to outline how issues of informal settlement upgrading 
affected the working poor and the most destitute. Furthermore, issues that affect other 
vulnerable groups stated above were treated generally as similarly affecting the poor in 
informal settlements. 
 
1.7 Ethical Considerations 
I remained objective throughout my analysis and presentation of information obtained 
from grey literature by putting aside my allegiance to the local branches of SANCO and 
the ANC and its alliance partners in Lebowakgomo. The risk of a bias testimony was 
partly addressed through critical and self reflection as well as engagement with literature 
to allow for some critical distance. However, I never abandoned my personal living 
memory in the process of my inquiry. On the contrary, I strived to build on it and develop 
it through my interaction with facts I obtained from primary documents. As for the two 
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interviews I have already outlined in item 1.5 above, I divulged my identity and 
explained the purpose of the research to the two respondents, gave the two respondents 
the choice to give or withhold consent at any time of the interview and withdraw if they 
so wished, obtained the consent of the two respondents to reveal their identity; avoided 
sensitive questions, and refrained from raising any hopes about the outcome of the 
interviews. 
 
Conclusion 
This research report is an attempt to add evidence to the debate on how upgrading of 
informal settlements can be achieved in line with the stipulations of Chapter 13 of the 
Code. The aim is to address the failure by municipalities to implement Chapter 13 of the 
Code by way of drawing lessons from the Civic Movement approach in Lebowakgomo 
during the period 1990-2000 and existing South African and international literature on 
informal settlements. 
 
The next Chapter deals with literature review and the conceptual framework of this study.  
Chapter 3 sketches the background within which the Civic Movement approach evolved.  
Chapter 4 interrogates the Civic Movement approach from the socio-economic angle 
while Chapter 5 scrutinises it from the political point of view.  Last but not least, Chapter 
6 points out lessons learnt from the Civic Movement approach and shows the road map 
national and international governments, the South African government in particular, need 
to follow for successful implementation of upgrading projects. 
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Chapter 2 
Literature review and conceptual framework 
2.1 Introduction 
The conceptual framework of this research report hinges on issues of urban/rural 
linkages, secure tenure, community participation and eradication of informal settlements. 
The intention is to address the problem that almost all municipalities in this country turn 
a blind eye to the new housing policy as adopted in 2004 and thus fail to move in a new 
housing policy direction. This can be ascribed to lack of political support from the central 
government and provincial governments. It can also be attributed to the fact that 
municipalities embrace zero-tolerance to both existing informal settlements and the 
formation of new informal settlements. Another problem is that a few municipalities that 
have adopted upgrading as a strategy do not implement it in terms of the principle 
approach of Chapter 13 of the Code. 
 
This chapter of the research report is concerned with a discourse on the issues raised 
above, including an overview of Chapter 13 of the Code, as reflected in the existing 
literature under the following headings: the Civic Movement nationally and in 
Lebowakgomo, informal settlements and informal settlement upgrading, eradication of 
informal settlements, urban-rural linkages, secure tenure and community participation. 
 
2.2 The Civic Movement nationally and in Lebowakgomo 
The civic organisations (civics) were formed by members of the civil society to address 
bread and butter issues in most townships and villages of South Africa in the late 1970s 
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(Huchzermeyer, 2004). After the formation of the United Democratic Front (UDF), an 
umbrella of organisations that were opposed to Apartheid, in 1983, the majority of the 
civics affiliated themselves to it. The UDF ‘spread the [civic] movement beyond formal 
townships into informal settlements’ (Ibid: 115) including ‘the new generation of 
informal settlements that emerged with the administrative ambiguities of the 1980s’ 
(Ibid). With the unbanning of the African National Congress (ANC) in 1990, the UDF 
was dissolved, leaving the civics uncoordinated at national level. Efforts at coordination 
at regional level led to the formation of the South African National Civic Organisation 
(SANCO) at national level in 1992.  The civic organisations which were operating under 
the umbrella of the UDF and those which subscribed to the ideals of the Freedom Charter 
that were formed after 1990 such as the Lebowakgomo Civic Association (LCA) 
immediately affiliated themselves to SANCO. 
 
The organisational structure of SANCO consisted of national, regions, sub-regions, 
branches, blocks and streets.  Currently, the organisational structure is still the same 
except that it includes provinces which were established after the 1994 democratic 
elections. Immediately after its formation in 1992, SANCO aligned itself with the ANC-
led Tripartite Alliance to constitute the Tripartite Alliance-Plus One.  The reason for 
alignment with the Tripartite Alliance, which consisted of the African National Congress 
(ANC), South African Communist Party (SACP) and Congress of South African Trade 
Unions (COSATU), was because it was felt that the ANC was in a better position to 
advance the cause of the civics as compared to other political organisations. 
 
 11
Immediately after the democratic elections of 1994, attempts were made by ANC leaders 
to address bread and butter issues of the community at local level in competition with 
SANCO. This occurred despite the fact that in the early 1990s, ‘local ANC leaders and 
branches generally allowed civics to play the leading role in local politics’ (Seekings, 
1997: 15).  This sudden change in approach was caused by the fact that the ANC leaders 
saw the local government ‘as a voice of the community and [thus] felt that it should not 
be accountable to the civic groups’ (Mayekiso, 2003: 72). For this reason, it was felt that 
the primary allegiance of Councillors was first to the ANC and only then to SANCO 
(Mayekiso, 2003). This was an endeavour to force SANCO Councillors ‘to choose 
between loyalty to the ANC and loyalty to SANCO’ (Seekings, 1996: 26). This resulted 
in the notion that the Ward Councillor ‘should answer directly to the electorate’ through 
ward meetings (Mayekiso, 2003: 72). As a result, ‘the historical bottom-up democracy of 
the Civic Movement was [ultimately] replaced by a top-down instrumentalist approach, 
which disempowered local civics’ (Ibid: 66). Amidst these developments, ‘council 
officials continued to develop projects without community involvement, and only 
included community groups in order to endorse developments’ (Ibid: 72). 
 
After the first democratic and community elections of 1994 and 1995 respectively, the 
Civic Movement lost many of its key cadres into government structures, ‘both as elected 
representatives and as civil servants’ (Seekings, 1997: 6). Mayekiso (2003: 62) argues 
that the fact that the civic lost its ‘cadres to local, provincial and national government 
hampered the capacity’ of its structures to represent community members. However, at its 
national conference in 1992, SANCO resolved to permit its leaders holding public office 
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to retain their positions in the Civic Movement. This move was aimed at addressing 
‘organisational problems caused by the exodus of leaders into public office’ (Ibid: 23). 
Mayekiso (2003) argues that this policy shift meant that SANCO ‘could contest local 
politics more effectively, contesting for influence within the ANC’ (Ibid). 
 
Mayekiso (2003: 59) further contends that ‘aside from the stress on councillors adopting 
neo-liberal municipal fiscal, infrastructure and privatisation policies (many of which were 
not fully understood), social movement organisations had to re-orient themselves to 
replace the use of confrontation as the first option in addressing urban issues with the 
democratic state’. To this end, these organisations ‘had to utilise consultation and 
collaboration as weapons to ensure service delivery and proper development of 
communities’ (Ibid: 60). Seekings (1997) adds that ‘many of the representative roles 
performed by civics at the local level hitherto’ were ceded to political parties and 
Councillors (1997: 1). However, as the major thrust of this research report will show, the 
local leadership of SANCO in Lebowakgomo ensured that these roles were turned into a 
boon (Ibid). This contradicts Zuern’s (2006: 187) argument that ‘a social movement 
needed to be more independent of the state in order to be effective’. It also contradicts her 
assertion that the take-over by the institution of state of many of the roles that were 
previously performed by the civics rendered the civics redundant.  
 
2.3 Informal settlements and informal settlement upgrading 
UN-Habitat (2006: 97) defines slums as ‘the generic term used to classify informal, 
illegal or unplanned settlements’. For it, informal settlements ‘reflect a dynamic and 
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diverse labour market and offer affordable housing to those who cannot, or will not, pay 
for accommodation in the city’ (2006: 50). Informal settlements originate from 
spontaneous or organised invasion of unused land. In established townships such as 
Lebowakgomo, planned land occupation took place on unused, unserviced but pegged 
sites on the periphery. In the case where they occur through the blessing of the 
authorities, such land invasions take cognisance of formal layouts. Of importance is that 
any land occupation that is modelled (informally) on the formal layouts creates ‘suitable 
conditions for in situ upgrading’ (Huchzermeyer, 2004:181). However, in most cases, 
illegal occupation in established townships takes place in an unorderly fashion in that it 
disregards the boundaries of sites and open spaces. 
 
Prior to the new dispensation in South Africa, informal settlement intervention was 
characterised by eviction of unlawful occupiers.  It was only in the 1990s that this 
strategy was toned down through the imposition of sites and services schemes on 
residents of informal settlements.  These schemes entailed provision of access to water 
and sanitation with stand-alone toilet structures together with freehold title for informal 
settlement dwellers.  The major problem is that ‘land regularisation and the extension of 
infrastructure into informal settlements’ took the form of a top-down approach whereby 
residents were treated as passive recipients of their housing needs by the authorities 
(Huchzermeyer, 2004:182; also see Mayekiso, 1996). Although they improved security 
of tenure, the sites and services schemes did not provide for houses for the poor, the 
majority of whom were residents of informal settlements.  By so doing, they perpetuated 
poverty and overcrowding.  Hence, the civics dismissed the products of sites and services 
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schemes as “toilet towns” because the introduction of these schemes did not fulfil their 
‘expectations of decent standards’ (Mayekiso, 1996: 247).  The fact that these schemes 
were ‘primarily concerned with economic efficiency and cost recovery’ means that they 
ignored the poverty factor as it applied in informal settlements (Ibid).  They also ignored 
to take cognisance of the fact that the poor could not muster the necessary resources to 
construct their own houses on serviced plots (Mayekiso, 1996).  
 
The first decade of democracy did not witness deviation from the sites and services 
schemes except for the inclusion of the top structure (house) through the Capital Subsidy 
Scheme.  In fact, in situ upgrading took the form of ‘replacement of informal settlements 
with formal township layouts, standardised plots with freehold title, and formal housing’ 
(Huchzermeyer, 2004:229).  Like the sites and services schemes, the once-off Capital 
Subsidy Scheme failed ‘to meaningfully take into account residents’ needs, realities, 
ideas and capacities’ (Ibid:76).  In addition, ‘the role of the community organisation and 
leadership was reduced to that of serving the project objectives’ (Ibid: 152). 
 
Further, identification and management of infrastructural projects was driven from 
outside through consultants.  As a result, there was lack of community engagement ‘over 
layout dimensions around existing patterns of land occupation’ (Ibid: 77).  Dwelling 
densities were also drastically reduced as the formal layout generally resulted ‘in 
increased plot sizes and wider access routes’ (Ibid: 151).  In addition, ‘the pending 
remodelling and standardisation of the settlement layout according to the norms and 
standards attached to the intervention funding’ discouraged individual households from 
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investing in permanent construction of their homes or incremental housing (Ibid: 229). 
To make matters even worse, ‘the residents’ prospects for an individual asset that was to 
be gained through the capital subsidy system’ discouraged any major popular challenge 
to the national policy of informal settlement intervention through the capital subsidy 
mechanism despite its flaws (Ibid: 230). 
 
The informal settlement intervention through the capital subsidy mechanism did not serve 
as a safety net for the poor. Rather, the delivery of freehold title through the mechanism 
of capital subsidy was ‘intended to tie the beneficiary household into a system of 
payment of rates and service charges, likewise a form of cost recovery introducing a new 
financial burden to the beneficiary households’ (Ibid: 147). In addition, the informal 
settlement intervention through the capital subsidy mechanism was part of ‘a government 
commitment to boost the macro-economy’ (Ibid: 35).  Further, the construction industry 
was not ‘interested in implementing complex, socially responsive in situ upgrading that 
would minimise social disruption and build on existing processes in informal settlements’ 
because it was only interested in profit-making (Ibid). 
 
Huchzermeyer (2008: 95) argues that ‘the South African government was far from 
embracing informal settlement upgrading’ at the beginning of the new millennium.  
Instead, it ‘focussed on relocation to formal housing, as well as to transit camps or 
temporary relocation areas, the latter in particular continuing apartheid practice’ (Ibid).  
This approach was consolidated through Chapter 12 of the National Housing Code in 
2004.  Henceforth, relocations were propelled by the desire to “beautify” cities in line 
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with the UN-Habitat slogan of ‘Cities without Slums’ with a view to attract investors and 
tourists. In my view, informal settlements that are located in the vicinity of major 
international airports such as Makausi in the city of Germiston and Joe Slovo in Cape 
Town thus became the target of such “beautification” and associated slum elimination.  
 
In the case of the city of Germiston, the Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality 
endeavoured to clear seven informal settlements located in and around the city and its 
precincts. In Makausi, for example, the Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality attempted 
to relocate the informal settlement dwellers from the area to Tsakane (about 40 km from 
the original settlement) on the pretext of health risk. This direct and negative eradication 
approach of the Ekurhuleni Metro can be ascribed to the fact that the said informal 
settlements are exposed to thousands of tourists who embark and disembark their flights 
at the nearby O.R. Tambo International Airport. 
 
For the above reasons, Chapter 12 of the Housing Code (Housing Assistance in 
Emergency Situations) overshadowed the implementation of Chapter 13 of the Housing 
Code (National Housing Programme on Upgrading of Informal Settlements) which was 
also introduced in 2004. The result of this unfortunate situation, coupled with lack of 
political support and ‘the widely practised negative approach to slum elimination’, was 
that Chapter 12 of the Housing Code was abused to remove informal settlements to the 
periphery rather than upgrade them through the principles of Chapter 13 of the Code 
(Huchzermeyer, 2007: 2). Hence, Chapter 13 of the Code was not really implemented, 
not even by any of South Africa’s large cities since its adoption in 2004 (Ibid: 2). Even 
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the nine informal settlement upgrading pilot projects that were initiated through Chapter 
13 of the Code were neither carried through nor attempted in accordance with its 
innovative principles (Huchzermeyer, 2008). The current so-called informal settlement 
upgrading projects that were and are still being implemented in Lebowakgomo, 
Polokwane and other cities and towns of South Africa are nowhere near voluntarily 
embracing the innovative principles of Chapter 13 of the Code. 
 
It is only in the recent case of Hangberg in Houtbay in the City of Cape Town that the 
first in situ upgrading project was applied for and approved for funding under Chapter 13 
of the Code ‘and in accordance with the principles defined in the programme’ in 2008 
(Huchzermeyer, 2008: 99). However, this project was ‘in response to initiative, lobbying 
and groundwork by the NGO Development Action Group’ (Ibid). In the same vein, the 
Durban-based grassroots social movement Abahlali BaseMjondolo is currently 
negotiating with Durban Metropolitan Municipality around having Chapter 13 of the 
Code implemented (Marie Huchzermeyer, Personal Communication, December 2008). 
Further, the Landless People’s Movement (LPM) has very recently secured a court order 
that mandates the City of Johannesburg to investigate the feasibility of Chapter 13 of the 
Code (Ibid).  
 
The abovementioned three cases show that municipalities neither pay attention to 
improve informal settlements nor get further involved in informal settlement upgrading 
as also noted by UN-Habitat (2006). These cases also parallel the Civic Movement 
approach, in which in situ upgrading of informal settlements was dependent on organised 
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civil society involvement, lobbying and negotiation. This will be expanded in Chapter 4 
and Chapter 5 of this research report. The problem with this approach is that civil society 
pressure is not well received by the authorities in the current environment. All the above 
factors stand as proof that Chapter 13 of the Code was never implemented by any of 
South Africa’s municipalities. It now becomes relevant to outline the basic tenets of 
Chapter 13 of the Code which follow next.  
 
2.4 An overview of Chapter 13 of the Housing Code 
The policy objective of Chapter 13 of the Code is ‘to vest access and usage of physical 
land assets in the hands of the urban poor’, and to ensure that informal settlement 
dwellers access permanent residential structures with security of tenure (Department of 
Housing, 2004b: 5). The target of this objective is to ‘fastrack the provision of security of 
tenure, the provision of basic municipal engineering services, the provision of social 
amenities [and community facilities] and the empowerment of informal settlement 
inhabitants to take charge of their own housing development’ (Ibid). Huchzermeyer 
(2006) contends that ‘in situ upgrading enables continued owner occupation of the 
existing dwelling structures and their incremental improvement over time, thus not 
imposing rigid-housing related costs’ (2006: 64). It also ‘confers several advantages such 
as high densities and associated land savings, the preservation of existing networks, and 
the optimisation of resources’ (Irurah et al, 2002: 13). 
 
The principle approach of Chapter 13 of the Code to upgrading of informal settlements is 
a holistic one characterised by an area and/or community focus ‘with minimum 
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disruption or distortion of existing fragile community networks and support structures’ 
(Department of Housing, 2004b: 6). Hence, it requires ‘upgrading of whole settlements 
on a community basis as opposed to the normal approval of individual subsidies in 
respect of specific qualifying beneficiaries’ (Ibid). The major thrust of this approach is 
not only to ‘ensure viable households and communities in areas allowing convenient 
access to economic opportunities, and to health, educational and social amenities’ but 
also to incentivise households to invest their own resources in starter or incremental 
housing (Ibid:3).  
 
Another important paradigm shift of Chapter 13 of the Code is provision of its funding 
options for purposes of upgrading. The Programme provides funding for land 
rehabilitation. Although no ceiling amount of funding is provided for land rehabilitation 
[to make the land suitable for habitation], a detailed business plan (including flood line 
and geo-technical reports) with detailed technical information is required to determine the 
feasibility and costs of upgrading (Huchzermeyer, 2006). This does not auger well for 
effective community participation in the planning layout process because it depends 
largely on technical expertise of civil engineers, geologists and project managers. Places 
that are singled out for land rehabilitation revolve around ‘settlements located in 
dangerous areas posing a threat to health and safety’ and disaster-prone areas (Ibid: 50). 
The Programme provides for the purchase of occupied land for rehabilitation or unused 
prime land for relocation (in instances where relocation cannot be avoided on the grounds 
of health risk). Such land purchases must be done on the basis of a motivation 
accompanied by three independent valuations from the affected municipality and by so 
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doing, subjects the choice of land to bureaucratic processes as opposed to affected 
informal settlement inhabitants (Huchzermeyer, 2006). However, ‘state departments and 
other public entities are encouraged to make well-located land available at no cost’ (Ibid: 
51). 
 
In cases where relocation cannot be avoided for the reason stated above, Chapter 13 of 
the Code provides for the involvement of informal settlement residents ‘in identifying 
whether a portion of land is well-located in relation to their livelihood strategies and 
opportunities for the development of their human capital (such as ability to access 
educational and social facilities)’ (Ibid: 51). It also requires the consent of informal 
settlement residents over a chosen relocation site. Further, Chapter 13 of the Code 
provides that “relocation must take place at a location as close as possible to the existing 
settlement and within the context of a community approved relocation strategy’ (Ibid: 
52). It also makes funding available for relocation support though this has been blamed 
by some affected community members and other commentators for having the effect of 
buying ‘instant community support for a relocation that does not make long-term 
livelihood sense’ (Ibid). 
 
The Programme seeks upgrading projects to be implemented ‘on the basis of a phased 
development approach’ (Department of Housing, 2004b: 3). Phase 1 of the Programme is 
regarded as a launching pad for ‘future delivery of secondary and tertiary social services 
such as schools, hospitals and police stations over a period of time’ (Ibid:5). This Phase 
entails ‘the initial/immediate provision of basic infrastructure (water and sanitation)’ 
 21
(Huchzermeyer, 2006: 53). In addition, it requires municipalities to be responsible for 
operational costs of such infrastructure. Huchzermeyer (2006) contends that the 
immediate provision of infrastructure ‘addresses health risks, while also freeing up time 
for women and children to pursue activities that secure a livelihood or develop human 
capital (such as education)’ (Ibid). Pugh (2001) also notes that environmental 
improvements ‘reduce disease and premature death, and in well conceived programmes 
achieve education and training among women’ (2001: 420), adding that this ‘can enhance 
at-home study and improve the aspirations for longer and valued lives’ (Ibid). Such an 
approach is crucial for the livelihoods of the poor considering that the “shortage of skills 
has an immediate bearing on poverty, education, unemployment, health and the 
environment – all targeted in the UN Millennium Development Goals” (The Star 
Workplace, 30.4.2008: 3).  
 
Phase 2 of the Programme caters for ‘provision of basic municipal engineering services’ 
consisting of ‘portable water, adequate sanitary facilities and domestic energy’ (Ibid). It 
should be noted that Phases 1-3 benefit all the inhabitants of informal settlements 
‘including persons currently excluded from any of the benefits of the housing Subsidy 
Scheme’ (Department of Housing, 2004b: 6).  Huchzermeyer (2006) argues that the new 
approach to land and infrastructure plays a central role in promoting tenure security and 
addressing vulnerability. Phase 3 of the Programme provides for the establishment of 
Housing Support Centres “to support households at an early stage regarding their rights, 
housing options and construction of various housing typologies in accordance with their 
needs, means and aspirations” (Huchzermeyer, 2006: 56). However, Phase 4 of the 
 22
Programme does not mention ‘the role for the Housing Support Centres, or support for 
the savings and community-based micro-lending, which would enable the incremental 
consolidation of upgraded informal settlements’ (Ibid: 56-7).  
 
Phase 4 of the Programme operates the same way as the Housing Subsidy Scheme (HSS) 
except for minor changes. While every informal settlement resident (except past and 
existing owners of residential property and those who benefited from state housing 
schemes in the past) is entitled access to land during Phases 1 to 3 of the upgrading 
process, Phase 4 distinguishes between those who qualify for top structures and those 
who do not (Huchzermeyer, 2006). The fate of those in brackets is “considered on a case-
by-case basis” (Ibid: 56). Those who qualify are allocated subsidies for top structures as 
Phase 4 benefits while those who do not qualify are not only denied access to these 
benefits but are also forced to pay for sites that were serviced in Phase 2 at cost. As 
reflected in Huchzermeyer (2006), although they are not excluded from Phases 1 to 3 
benefits, illegal immigrants and child-headed households are excluded altogether from 
individual freehold ownership during Phase 4 of the Programme. Huchzermeyer (2006) 
further contends that the qualification criteria for Phase 4 benefits ‘may unwittingly call 
for premature pregnancies or unions, as having a dependent qualifies single people for the 
consolidation subsidy’ (Ibid: 56). 
 
In terms of Section 13.11.6 of the Code, ‘one of the fundamental principles of the 
[Informal Settlement Upgrading] programme is the empowerment of the community to 
enable them to assume ownership of their own development and improvement of life’ 
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(Department of Housing, 2004b:33). To this end, the Programme makes funding 
available for ‘the community participation and empowerment process’ including 
community engagement in layout planning (Ibid: 57). Layout designs are expected to 
cater for various stand sizes and to ‘enable access for pedestrians and municipal 
infrastructure and services, including emergency services’ (Huchzermeyer, 2006: 57). 
Section 13.6.1 bullet No. 3 of Chapter 13 of the Code provides for Human Settlement 
Redevelopment Funding for ‘community participation and facilitation, conflict resolution 
and housing support’ (Department of Housing, 2004b:21). The aim is to generate 
‘partnerships that are supported through inclusive, empowering, flexible and responsive 
governance of the upgrading process, in a way that supports good practice criteria rather 
than (inflexibly) forcing role players to use statutory arrangements (e.g., ward 
committees) regardless of their efficacy’ (Ibid). In summary, the Programme encourages 
‘the development of social capital by supporting the active participation of the 
communities in the design, implementation and evaluation of projects’ on the strength of 
what already exists in the locality (Ibid: 5). 
 
Huchzermeyer (2006) argues that Chapter 13 of the Code recommends a permit or 
Permission To Occupy (PTO) as a preferred tenure form for informal settlements. In her 
view, this form of tenure ‘does not impose costs on the resident household, but provides 
adequate tenure security for household investments to be made in the dwelling’ 
(Huchzermeyer, 2006: 55). However, in terms of Section 13.2.2 of Chapter 13 of the 
Code, ‘secure tenure may be achieved through a variety of tenure arrangements and these 
are to be defined through a process of engagement between local authorities and 
 24
residents’ (Department of Housing, 2004b: 8). Although it embraces alternative forms of 
tenure as stated above, Chapter 13 of the Code favours individual freehold title. This 
contradiction can be ascribed to the fact that the Programme conceptualises individual 
freehold title as having the potential to provide collateral for loans (Department of 
Housing, 2004b). Therefore, it does not deviate from the government tendency to focus 
‘its energy on home ownership and [thereby] neglect[s] the rental markets’ (Angels, 
2000: 318). It should be noted that Huchzermeyer (2006) is alive to these shortcomings. 
 
An overview of Chapter 13 of the Code was necessary before an illumination of the 
socio-economic (Chapter 4) and political (Chapter 5) components of the Civic Movement 
approach. The aim is to enable the reader to have a better understanding of the housing 
policy document on upgrading of informal settlements and the advocacy approach of the 
Civic Movement. Having sketched an overview of Chapter 13 of the Code, it is necessary 
to give a background to the study area (to which I turn in the next chapter of this research 
report) for a proper understanding of the genesis of the Civic Movement approach. 
 
Although the Civic Movement approach was similar in many respects with major tenets 
of Chapter 13 of the Code, the comparison or the testing whether the Civic Movement 
approach aligns with that of Chapter 13 of the Code is somewhat limited by the very 
upgradeable nature of the informal settlements of Units R and S Phase II and III in 
Lebowakgomo. It would have been interesting to test the Civic Movement approach to 
informal settlements that a) did not emerge with SANCO content, b) were on contested 
land or very valuable land with vocal estate pressure, c) were on land not immediately 
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suitable for housing due to flooding/dolomite/slopes, d) did not have SANCO aligned 
communities, and e) had pressure of ‘shack lordism’.  Despite these limitations, Chapters 
4 and 5 of this research report will demonstrate, without any shadow of doubt, that there 
are important similarities between Chapter 13 of the Code and the Civic Movement 
approach from which we can draw lessons for proper implementation of the Informal 
Settlement Upgrading Programme. 
 
2.5 Eradication of Informal Settlements 
2.5.1 Definition 
The concept eradication of informal settlements means different things to various 
commentators and other members of the broader civil society.  However, the South 
African government has adopted this concept as a target to address the problems of 
informal settlements.  What does this concept mean?  Is eradication an appropriate 
concept in dealing with the challenges of informal settlements?  To what extent is the use 
of this concept influenced by international thinking? Is the eradication approach not 
tantamount to the proverbial cart that was put before the horse?  Does the concept of 
eradication have a bearing on zero-tolerance to new informal settlements?  Is the South 
African government’s eradication approach feasible? 
 
If the dictionary meaning of the term eradicate is anything to go by, then the South 
African government seeks to obliterate or uproot (Collins English Dictionary, 2006) 
informal settlements through a systematic approach of informal settlement upgrading and 
prevention of the emergence of new ones. Broadly speaking, UN-Habitat associates the 
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term eradication with ‘clearance’ and ‘eviction’. UN-Habitat (2006) as reviewed by 
Huchzermeyer (2008) defines it as improvement of the lives of slum or informal 
settlement dwellers and reduction of slum or informal settlement growth rates. 
Huchzermeyer (2008) distinguishes between the positive and indirect approach and the 
negative and direct approach to slum upgrading and prevention. On the one hand, she 
defines the former as improving the lives of informal settlement dwellers through 
provision of land, services and housing. On the other hand, she describes the negative and 
indirect approach as doing away with slums through ‘eviction and forced relocation from 
existing informal settlements, and criminalisation, arrests and forceful prevention of the 
emergence of new informal settlements’ through the state’s political target of shack-free 
cities by 2014 (Ibid: 94). Based on this distinction, it is clear that the concept of 
eradication has both positive and negative connotations to informal settlement upgrading. 
 
2.5.2 Is the use of the concept eradication appropriate for upgrading of informal   
         settlements? 
Huchzermeyer (2006) is not comfortable with the unqualified use of the concept of 
eradication of informal settlements. It is her deep held view that the unqualified use of the 
term eradication ‘can be misunderstood as a blanket mandate to remove shacks in the 
absence of solutions that eradicate poverty, remove vulnerability and promote inclusion’ 
(2006:44). She argues that ‘unwittingly, the political message to informal settlement 
dwellers may be that they are to be eradicated, or at least displaced, and probably not 
given a meaningful role in defining a solution’ (Ibid). In her view, ‘improving lives is 
possible without eliminating slums’ (Huchzermeyer, 2007). She further contends that it is 
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‘unlikely that informal settlements will be eradicated’ (Ibid). On the contrary, attempts at 
eradication will result in ‘increased overcrowding, lack of privacy, spread of 
communicable diseases’ (Ibid). In this way, ‘people’s lives are not improving, and 
uncertainty increases’ (Ibid). 
 
Huchzermeyer’s (2008) qualified approach contradicts UN-Habitat’s cautious approach 
to the use of the term eradication. According to Huchzermeyer (2008: 95), ‘whereas UN-
Habitat would discourage the use of the term ‘eradication’ altogether, it is used in 
Breaking New Ground only in the positive and indirect approach to doing away with 
informal settlements’. In fact, she supports the indirect and positive approach and 
discourages the direct and negative side of eradication. For her, Section 2 (1)  iii of the 
Housing Act promotes a positive and indirect approach, requiring all tiers of government 
to establish, develop and maintain ‘socially and economically viable communities’ as 
well as ‘safe and healthy living conditions to ensure the elimination and prevention of 
slums and slum conditions’ (Ibid). In order to realise this objective, the South African 
government has adopted Chapter 13 of the Code as a tool to eradicate informal 
settlements.  In spite of the government’s policy on informal settlements as stated above, 
local municipalities do not embrace this paradigm shift in national government thinking. 
 
COHRE (2005: 31) maintains that ‘the term ‘eradication of informal settlements’ used in 
the new housing plan raises concerns regarding measures municipalities may resort to in 
order to ‘eradicate’ existing informal settlements and stamp out any attempts at new 
informal settlements formulation’ (2005:31). However, it also acknowledges that ‘the 
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plan’s intention is clarified as a ‘shift’ from ‘conflict and neglect’ to integration and 
cooperation, leading to stabilisation and integration of these areas into the broader urban 
fabric” (Ibid). Although I acknowledge that the use of the term eradication may have 
negative connotations, I share Huchzermeyer’s (2008) qualified use of the term because 
the application of this term in a positive light may yield positive spin-offs for upgrading 
of informal settlements. Failure to use this term altogether means that governments 
worldwide will remain in perpetual improvement without the actual achievement of the 
target of eradication of informal settlements. 
 
2.5.3 Evolution of the informal settlement eradication approach 
Although the government rhetoric to move the country to a shack-free environment was 
not incorporated into the final version of Chapter 13 of the Code, it signalled the 
government’s intention to eradicate informal settlements.  That Chapter 13 of the Code is 
silent about the intention “to moving towards a shack-free society” does not suggest that 
it does not support moves into this direction (Huchzermeyer, 2006:44).  It is a fact that 
Chapter 13 of the Code is an instrument introduced by a policy document entitled A 
Comprehensive Plan for the Development of Sustainable Human Settlements, commonly 
known as ‘Breaking New Ground’ (BNG) ‘to support the focused eradication of informal 
settlements’ (Department of Housing, 2004a: 46). The government has set as its task the 
eradication of informal settlements by 2014. This goal is mentioned in Chapter 13 of the 
Code with a recommendation that the identification of pilot projects should take account 
of the objective ‘to achieve the national goal of eradication of informal settlements by 
2014’ (Department of Housing, 2004b: 31). Chapter 13 of the Code also emphasises that 
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‘any re-invasion of the land must be promptly dealt with in accordance to the provision of 
relevant legislation’ (Ibid: 57). However, it does not suggest changes to existing 
legislation; it implicitly promotes the introduction of new legislation like Kwazulu-Natal 
Slums Act which is aimed at eradicating informal settlements in that province.  
 
Clearly, the South African government was influenced by international thinking to set 
itself the unrealistic target of eradicating informal settlements by 2014. The adoption of 
the eradication approach owes much to the government’s misinterpretation of Goal 7 
Target 11 of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) that seeks to ‘achieve 
significant improvement in the lives of at least 100 million slum dwellers by 2020’ (UN-
Habitat, 2003:8). The adoption of the eradication approach can also be said to be part of 
the global wave ‘which is putting pressure on national and local governments to 
“beautify” or “clean up” their cities in order to become competitive in a global economy 
that has seen the gap between the rich and the poor widen’ (UN-Habitat, 2006: 92). This 
was given a great impetus by the granting of the bid to host the 2010 Soccer World Cup 
by the Federation of International Football Association (FIFA) on 15 May 2004.  
Obviously, this put political pressure on the government to expedite the process of 
eradication of informal settlements. 
 
As Huchzermeyer (2008) has pointed out, the problem with the South African state is that 
it is driven by the slogan of ‘cities without slum’ rather than by the actual MDG target of 
improving the lives of slum dwellers. In Huchzermeyer’s (2006: 45) view, the granting of 
the bid to host the 2010 Soccer Showpiece influenced the government ‘to adopt an 
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additional agenda of transforming all informal settlements ‘visible’ to international 
visitors into respectable living environments’ through the Informal Settlement Upgrading 
Programme, i.e., Chapter 13 of the Code. For her, this is much more so given the fact that 
informal settlements ‘pose an embarrassment to government’ (Huchzermeyer, 2007).  
 
2.5.4 Is eradication of informal settlements feasible?   
Given budget constraints and the fact that access to land is still tied to the housing 
package, and the fact that informal settlements are mushrooming at a faster rate than the 
actual delivery of houses, it is impossible to eradicate informal settlements by the target 
date.  In addition, it would not even be possible to achieve that by 2020 which is the 
Millennium Development Goal’s (MDG) target of improvement (again not eradication of 
informal settlements) of the lives of 100 million slum dwellers. Another handicap to 
eradication of informal settlements is the fact that the Informal Settlement Upgrading 
Programme ‘requires its upgrading projects to be ‘within an approved Integrated 
Development Plan [IDP] of the municipality in question’ (Huchzermeyer, 2006:49). In 
addition, given the negative attitude municipalities display against informal settlements, 
most municipalities use the rhetoric of ‘queue jumping’ and orderly (sequential) 
development to prioritise older low-income residential areas on their IDPs 
(Huchzermeyer, 2006). In fact, restrictions placed on the development of land outside an 
approved IDP of the municipality negate government commitment to the eradication of 
informal settlements by 2014 and thereby, prolong the vulnerability of the residents of 
informal settlements. Moreover, the system of wardism (whereby Councillors allocate 
resources on a ward basis) to appease Ward Councillors and political decisions ‘override 
 31
important programme principles, particularly those that are delicably supported by the 
concepts of poverty, vulnerability and social inclusion’ (Ibid: 49). Hence, Huchzermeyer 
(2006) urges municipalities to ‘revise their IDPs so as to align them with the principles of 
the Informal Upgrading Programme’ (2006: 51).  
 
Further, most municipalities tighten municipal by-laws to prevent the mushrooming of 
new informal settlements. This is in line with the conception of Chapter 13 of the Code 
that ‘strict enforcement of municipal by-laws’ should be used to prevent re-invasion or 
occupation of vacated land (Department of Housing, 2004b: 57). This serves as evidence 
that, contrary to what Huchzermeyer (2008) would like us believe, clearing shacks is an 
approach that is indirectly promoted under Chapter 13 of the Code. In addition, some 
municipalities already take precautionary measures by relocating approved informal 
settlement beneficiaries to serviced sites and cleanse the vacated area of any shacks even 
before construction of top structures could commence in the area to which they are 
relocated, let alone the official hand-over of completed housing units. However, I share 
Huchzermeyer’s (2008) assertion that shack clearance does not serve ‘as an improvement 
in the lives of those living in informal settlements’ (2008: 98). Further, municipalities do 
not bother to accelerate the programme of informal settlement upgrading. This serves as 
evidence that municipalities are not in ‘the forefront of translating the Millennium 
Development Goals, particularly Goal 7 Target 11, into their own city-level goals and 
targets, and subsequently adopt citywide strategies for achieving them’ (UN-Habitat, 
2006: 176). Another major problem is that local authorities use the question of health risk 
as a pretext to relocation. 
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The proposed amendments to the Prevention of Illegal Eviction (PIE) Act which provides 
for shack demolitions when beneficiaries access Phase 4 benefits and receive permanent 
houses in order to prevent land re-invasion, will obviously strengthen the hands of 
municipalities the majority of whom practice zero-tolerance to invasions (Huchzermeyer, 
2008). The proposed PIE amendments seek ‘to tighten the criminalisation of land 
invasion’ (Ibid: 10). By so doing, the proposed PIE amendments ignore the fact that 
‘informal land occupation provides access to the city for the poor, whereas formal 
development continues to segregate’ (Huchzermeyer, 2007). The proposed PIE 
amendments are in conflict with UN-Habitat’s stance against ‘eviction, forced relocation 
to controlled transit camps, criminalisation of land invasions’, etc., as measures for 
prevention of the emergence of informal settlements (Huchzermeyer, 2008: 95).  
 
2.6 Urban-Rural Linkages 
The choice on where to live in urban areas is influenced by factors such as urban-rural 
ties, kin systems, gender relations and religion. For the purposes of this report, my 
discussion will be limited to urban-rural linkages and its associated kin systems. 
 
Smit (2006) argues that ‘surveys in South Africa have been unanimous in showing that a 
large proportion of urban households have strong rural links (both an urban and a rural 
home, with some family members living at each home)’ (2006: 115). He also asserts that 
the prevalence of rural-urban linkages is much higher in informal settlements. In his 
view, more often than not, households in informal settlements ‘have a rural home at 
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which members of the urban-based component(s) of the extended family frequently 
visit’(Ibid). For him, ‘the reasons for children not living in informal settlements include 
inadequate access to schooling, overcrowding, lack of access to electricity, lack of access 
to water and sanitation and safety concerns’(Ibid). In short, a rural home has the potential 
role to play ‘as a safety net within the context of a diversified livelihood strategy’ (Ibid). 
 
Affordable Housing Institute (2005) identifies urban informal areas as ‘entry points to 
urban life for migrants from rural areas’ (2005:3).  It attributes rural-urban migration to 
the fact that the rural poor seek ‘access to the city and the work and income opportunities 
they hope it promises’ (Ibid). UN-Habitat (2006: 50) identifies ‘perceived and actual 
social and economic benefits’ such as health care and education services as the driving 
force behind rural-urban migration. In summary, cities ‘provide many opportunities for 
investment which not only support urban development but also contribute to rural 
development in an environment of urban-rural linkages’ (Ibid: 47). 
 
Affordable Housing Institute (2005) argues that informal access to land in urban areas is 
‘often governed by rurally-based social relationships’ as well as ‘by the specific 
household’s rural land access’ (2005:8). Royston (2006: 176) adds that ‘for poor 
households, interests may be in opportunities for informal activities that are affordable by 
their very informality, while others may have the conventionally assumed interests in 
permanent urbanization, and the promise and expectations of formalisation’. UN-Habitat 
(2003: 26) contends that most migrants from the rural areas base their choices on where 
to live on experience; hence most of them ‘have contacts (friends) or relatives in the city’. 
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Once they arrive in urban areas, their housing options are restricted by poverty; hence 
they seek the cheapest form of housing they can afford. Given the problem of 
affordability, some choose affordable rental housing ‘until they can manage no longer’ 
and move into informal settlements while others prefer shelter they can afford to build, 
‘backyard shacks or other informal accommodation’ (Ibid: 29). 
 
As far as the issue of secure tenure (to which I turn in more detail in the next section) is 
concerned, Lalloo (1999: 44) argues that households with rural ties ‘are confronted with 
the choice of consolidating either their rural or urban base’. Royston (2006) adds that 
‘informal tenure may be a secure place to live in as cheaply as possible while in 
employment in the city’ (2006: 76). Huchzermeyer (2004: 163) contends that households 
with rural ties want ‘access to a cheap place to live’ in urban areas because they prefer ‘to 
consolidate in the rural areas’ (Ibid: 158). Affordable Housing Institute (2005: 8) adds 
that ‘retaining the rural base is especially important for economically vulnerable 
households – it becomes their safety net in case of their own or their relatives’ economic 
failure in the city’. It further maintains that such households’ urban residence is likely to 
be about access to income opportunities, from which any surplus would be sent back to 
the rural area to invest in land and housing there’ (Ibid). For this reason, such households 
accept capital subsidy housing only to sell it informally or even rent it, ‘moving back into 
informal settlements’ (Ibid). 
 
University of the Witwatersrand Research Team (2004a), in its study on supporting 
informal settlements, points out  that ‘some residents moved into informal settlements 
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after having sold their subsidized houses, usually due to financial difficulties, e.g., having 
to pay rates while generating no income/having to make a living, with the house being 
located far away from job opportunities’ (2004a: 5). This can be ascribed to the fact that 
poor households prefer places that offer ‘reasonable and convenient access’ to better 
economic opportunities that do not place further costs to their livelihoods (Lalloo, 1999: 
41-2). Therefore, it seems evident that urban-rural linkages and poverty are overriding 
factors that influence the choice of where to live for poor households in the urban areas of 
our major cities and secondary towns. However, the choice of where to live is limited by 
the extent of tenure security, which I turn to next. 
 
2.7 Secure Tenure 
2.7.1 Definition 
What is secure tenure, security of tenure or tenure security? Is it title, access to shelter or 
right to land or a combination of the three?  Is formal or informal tenure an appropriate 
form of secure tenure for the poor?  In whose interest do the processes of streamlining 
regulations to access tenure and the land titling programmes work?  Is the debate about 
the question of secure tenure the same as that of the land question in the context of the 
urban housing market?  Is it the question of chicken and egg, as to which one comes first?  
It is to the interrogation of these issues in the context of informal settlements and their 
upgrading that I now turn. 
 
Secure tenure is a broad term the definition of which depends on the school of thought to 
which a person belongs. Put in a simplified manner, secure tenure means security of the 
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residential status of a person living in a particular locality or the right to housing within a 
given locality.  International literature as reviewed by University of the Witwatersrand 
(2004b: 18) conceives security of tenure as reduction of vulnerability, enablement of 
‘choice in selecting/developing tenure options through community participation’ coupled 
with ‘recognition of the link between livelihoods and land tenure’ (Ibid). It also regards 
secure tenure as the ability ‘to access any space where the poor can obtain a basic 
livelihood without fear of eviction’ as well as ‘the ability to move when livelihood 
opportunity change[s]’ (Ibid). UN-Habitat (2003: 168) adds that secure tenure means 
protection from involuntary eviction from ‘land or residence, except in exceptional 
circumstances, and then only by means of a known and agreed legal procedure, which 
must itself be objective, equally applicable, contestable and independent’. Thus, ‘security 
of tenure can be considered the main component of the right to housing, and an essential 
prerequisite for access to citizenship’ (Ibid). 
 
2.7.2 Land and titling and affordability 
The debate about secure tenure pits the neo-liberal approach against alternatives to the 
market approach. On the one hand, alternatives to the market approach regard land as a 
safety net and a ‘livelihood-supporting asset’ for the poor (Royston, 2006:175). For this 
approach, ‘access to land is a fundamental human right necessary for a secure livelihood’ 
(UN-Habitat, 2006:95).  On the other hand, the neo-liberal scholars conceive land as a 
formal asset that can be exchanged for capital, leading to further investments in the house 
and increased property values. In addition, they regard legal title as a safety net for the 
poor. They also hold the view that the legal title transforms ‘the dwellings of those who 
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live in squalor of squatter [informal] settlements into assets recognised by the formal 
sector’ (Attuahene, 2004: 1111). This approach has been incorporated into Chapter 13 of 
the Housing Code. 
 
However, Angel (2000) argues that ‘tenure choice is the single most important 
determinant of housing demand for all households, overshadowing the importance of 
both the quality of the structure and the amount of living space’ (2000: 315). Nientied 
and van der Linden (1988) also note that ‘housing and improvement of houses often do 
not have a high priority among squatters [Unlawful Occupiers]’ (1988:145). In their 
view, ‘economic conditions are considered more important than housing’ by the poor 
(Ibid). The problem with the neo-liberal approach is that it confines itself to what it 
perceives to be good for the market and thereby neglects the impact its negative outcomes 
have on the poor. This can be ascribed to its reliance on ‘western concepts of society 
which began to develop in a particular social, economic and political context’ and thus do 
not hold in other contexts (Smith, 1999:41). As a result, it ignores the fact that ‘there are 
major obstacles for poor people to access formal credit’ (Royston, 2006:173).   
 
As UN-Habitat (2006: 95) has pointed out, many examples around the world show that 
titling ‘has not necessarily increased access to credit or prevented growth of new informal 
settlements’. Even a few that may access credit by using their properties as collateral may 
loose it through ‘sale in execution for debt’ much more so given the fact that non-
payment is met by repossession in an economic system that is propelled by the profit 
motive (Royston, 2006:173). Therefore, the use of property as collateral results in a 
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‘vicious cycle of extralegality or informality–formalisation–revision into informality in 
terms of which an individual may transfer newly formalised property, and return to an 
informal settlement’ (Ibid: 169). Hence, the poor consider the use of property as 
collateral as too risky. This dispels the notion that the use of land as collateral can work 
better for the poor.  
 
2.7.3 Is ownership title an appropriate form of tenure for the poor?   
UN-Habitat (2003) regards the long-term objective of the market-oriented approach as 
promotion of ‘private ownership through the allocation of individual freehold/property 
titles’ (2003: 170). In its conception, ‘these measures are expensive and may price the 
poor out of the land market’ (Ibid). They may also ‘hinder community cohesion, dissolve 
social links, or induce or accelerate segregation processes through market eviction’ 
(Ibid). Huchzermeyer (2004) adds that vulnerability within the housing markets ‘is 
important evidence against the often-held neo-liberal assumption that the principles of 
middle-income property markets apply to, or can be imposed on, informal settlements’ 
(2004: 34). In her view, ‘market assumptions fail to recognize the possibility to explore 
the concept of tenure security in the light of options to freehold title, be they leasehold, 
communal ownership or the formal recognition of the existing informal tenure system’ 
(Ibid:154). She further argues that ‘tenure security cannot be achieved without 
affordability’ (Huchzermeyer, 2006: 54). Given lack of affordability as a result of high 
poverty levels in informal settlements, the poor are unlikely to maintain a formal system 
of tenure security (Royston, 2006; also See Huchzermeyer, 2006). This is much more so 
given that ‘few South Africans can afford much at all’ (Pottie, 2003: 132). Therefore, 
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lack of affordability pushes the poorest out of the market ‘to seek subsistence shelter on 
the city’s periphery’ (Huchzermeyer, 2004: 39). 
 
UN-Habitat (2003: 169) further contends that large-scale allocation of property titles ‘has 
often resulted in increasing housing prices within the settlements, and/or in an increase in 
the cost of services, both of which have tended to exclude the poorest sections of the 
population’. Huchzermeyer (2004: 29) adds that the dominant South African informal 
settlement intervention ‘ties beneficiaries not only into fully registered freehold title, 
which is costly to transfer, but also into a system of rates and service charge billing’. 
Therefore, ‘solutions that are not affordable to beneficiaries in the long term will lead to 
their displacement to housing areas that impose fewer costs, usually new or remaining 
informal settlements’ (Huchzermeyer, 2006: 54). In this way, ‘tenure security is not 
reaching the most vulnerable groups’ (UN-Habitat, 2006: 92). 
 
2.7.4 Housing norms and standards 
Efforts aimed at enhancing affordability and innovation in upgrading projects requires 
flexibility in the application of housing norms and standards. Angel (2000: 162) argues 
that whilst building codes and standards result in an increase in housing quality, they also 
lead to a decrease in affordability. According to him, insistence on affordable standards 
‘can force households to pay more for housing against their will, or it can force them to 
live illegally’. However, UN-Habitat (2006: 58) maintains that ‘disregard of building 
codes has clear implications for the durability and safety of housing’. In its view, there is 
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a need to ‘respect current building standards’ for purposes of ‘disaster mitigation and 
vulnerability reduction’ (Ibid). 
 
Roux (2004) argues that to insist on compliance with the National Building Regulations 
Act ‘in the upgrading process would place an impossible burden on residents of informal 
settlements who attempt progressively to improve the standard of their houses’ (2004:17). 
He suggests that municipalities should ensure that land falling within their area of 
jurisdiction is exempted from the application of norms and standards. Such an approach 
is likely to ‘send a powerful signal to the residents of the settlement that they had been 
accepted as citizens of the local state’ (Ibid). UN-Habitat (2003: 165) adds that the 
introduction of user-friendly ‘regulatory frameworks will eliminate inappropriate 
standards of provision that raise costs’. This approach ‘combines protective 
administrative or legal measures against forced evictions – including the provision of 
titles that can be upgraded if required – with the provision of basic services’ UN-Habitat 
(Ibid). 
 
2.7.5 Are alternative forms to ownership tenure suitable for upgrading projects? 
Angel (2000) contends that ‘the perceptions of different tenures tend to vary among 
cultures’ (Ibid: 325).  Hence, he propagates for striking a balance between ownership and 
other forms of tenure.  In his view, this will afford consumers an opportunity to ‘choose 
freely between one form of tenure and the other’ (Ibid: 19). Attuahene (2004) adds that 
‘government-owned, low-income, or rental housing may be more suitable options than 
ownership, given the situation of those in extreme poverty’ (2004:1173). 
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In order to circumvent expensive and time-consuming tenure regularisation programmes 
in South Africa, Royston (2006: 176) propagates for tenure security ‘which involves a 
range of possible options along a continuum of tenure arrangement, not only individual 
title as currently configured in our centralised system of deeds registration’. UN-Habitat 
(2003) posits ‘a wide range of options, from full ownership to less exclusive forms of 
possession and use’ (2003:168). This requires simple legal and regulatory measures such 
as ‘bills, voter registration forms, ration cards and municipal tax receipts’ as a starting 
point of regularisation (UN-Habitat, 2006: 194; also See Royston, 2006). This form of 
tenure security can be ‘upgraded according to future needs’ of individual households 
(University of the Witwatersrand Team, 2004d: 57). As Smit (2006: 122) puts it, ‘a one-
size fits all approach to informal settlement upgrading, which ignores the differences 
between and within informal settlements, is not going to be successful’. 
 
2.8 Community participation 
2.8.1 Definition 
Community participation refers to meaningful involvement of community members in 
matters that affect their well being based on the bottom-up approach. You and Waceke 
(2003: 8) argue that meaningful participation ‘goes beyond soliciting the views and 
opinions of various stakeholders’. It entails active involvement of the community ‘in the 
decision-making process from beginning to end, from policy idea to design of plans, to 
political ratification, to practical implementation’ (Flyvbjerg, 2002: 364). In the context 
of informal settlement upgrading, it specifically means ‘bottom-up involvement, from the 
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decision to legalise a particular informal settlement, through to the design of community 
facilities and the tenure options offered to the residents’ and monitoring and evaluation of 
planning and development including every facet of life (Roux, 2004: 26). This requires 
empowerment of the civil society to make choices that would radically alter their lives 
and thereby reduce dependency. Empowerment in turn presupposes recognition of the 
principles of transparency and accountability and capacity building, i.e., to capacitate the 
ability of the community to participate. These aspects have been incorporated in Chapter 
13 of the Code as mechanisms to empower communities to manage themselves in the 
context of state support. Is community participation replicable at scale? It is to the 
interrogation of these issues that I now turn. 
 
2.8.2 Reasons for lack of effective community participation 
Despite provisions of Chapter 13 of the Code, informal settlement communities are 
exposed to planning and development processes in which they have little or no say. 
United Nations (2007) contends that ‘where there has been consultation it has often been 
done in a tokenistic manner after plans have already been put in place’ (Ibid). This top-
down approach with minimal community participation is ascribed ‘to lack of institutional 
and technical capacities to undertake projects of the magnitude of informal settlement 
upgrading’, on the part of municipalities (Jenkins, 1999: 442) and the weakness of civil 
society organisations, ‘lack of funding options and few opportunities to properly engage 
with government’ (United Nations, 2007: 6). In order to address this problem, United 
Nations (2007: 10) propagates for ‘national and local funding and resourcing of civil 
society organisations’. This proposition can be utilised to compliment provisions of 
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Chapter 13 of the Code in the elaboration of strategies to maximise citizen participation 
as outlined in Section 2.4 in this chapter of the research report. This calls for ‘a stronger 
and closer collaboration between government and civil society organisations, not only in 
terms of delivery, but also in terms of having open avenues for advocacy and dialogue’ 
(Ibid: 9). 
 
Community participation is also stifled by the challenge of ‘local politics’ because 
political bickering breeds and nurtures ‘reluctance to work with non-statutory bodies’ on 
the part of politicians across the three spheres of government (University of the 
Witwatersrand, 2004b: 40). Due to their obsession with power and the need to protect and 
consolidate their positions, politicians are generally politically sensitive to the leadership 
and dominant role of community organisations (Hardoy and Hardoy, 1991). This is 
further complicated by the fact that ‘civil servants and politicians collude in distrust of 
community initiatives and even more so of devolving decision-making to community 
level’ (Jenkins, 1999: 442). This corroborates Smith’s (1999:143) assertion that the idea 
of a society based on self-managed communities is ‘faced with the unwillingness of the 
state to relinquish any real measure of power, among other obstacles’. Situations of this 
nature do not allow for constructive engagement because such an approach depends on 
the willingness of those who wield power in government. 
 
Another inhibiting factor to citizen participation is that ‘community activity is hindered 
and repressed rather than facilitated in the rush for rapid delivery’ (Jenkins, 1999: 444).  
Huchzermeyer (2004: 152) asserts that ‘to reduce the role of the community or 
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organisation and leadership to that of serving the project objectives does not allow for 
people’s collective control over development’. Given the zero-tolerance approach to roll-
over of funds by the Special Committee on Public Accounts (SCOPA) in this country, 
‘government officials are more concerned on delivery’ (University of the Witwatersrand 
Research Team, 2004b:15). The rush for rapid delivery forces developers to regard 
community engagement and job creation as obstacles to meeting set targets and time 
frames. Jenkins (1999: 438) maintains that although lack of community involvement may 
expedite the process of delivery, ‘the fundamental problems of decision-making on 
appropriate standards and affordability’ will remain unresolved. To make matters even 
worse, the outcome tends to be unaffordable ‘or not in the form desired by many’ 
(Jenkins, 1999: 444). 
 
Further, beneficiaries are not afforded the opportunity to input on the house design, 
choice of building materials, etc. This is exacerbated by the fact that more emphasis is 
‘placed on technical and managerial efficiency’ (Jenkins, 1999:441).  As a result, the 
house design fails to adapt ‘to the wide variety of housing demand, especially given low 
levels of affordability at the end of the low-income market, and is even less applicable in 
terms of dealing with upgrading’ (Ibid). As UN-Habitat (2003: 165) succinctly captures 
it, participatory slum upgrading should be ‘conducted not as technical expertise, but as a 
political, social and organisational plan’. 
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2.8.3 How far can effective community participation be enhanced? 
Smit (2006) contends that ‘beneficiary participation needs to occur through a committee 
elected by beneficiaries, and the committee needs to be accountable to, and regularly 
report back to, the beneficiaries’ (2006:120).  In his view, ‘stakeholders from surrounding 
areas should not have the right to participate directly in decision making around informal 
settlement upgrading (as they can derail the process), but they should be regularly 
informed about the process and be able to make inputs and have their view considered’ 
(Ibid).  He also postulates ‘capacity building of committee and forum members and of 
local government officials who will be involved with the community’ (Ibid). 
 
The proposition and suggestions about ‘capacity-building and reskilling among officials 
and councillors to enable them to work creatively “outside the box” that develop new 
operational approaches’ are aimed at enhancing the implementation of Chapter 13 of the 
Code (University of the Witwatersrand Research Team, 2004b:52). According to Smit 
(2006), ‘NGOs have an important role to play in building the capacity of communities to 
participate in the development process, and providing ongoing advice and support’ (Ibid: 
121). For reasons that I will outline in Section 5.2, I do not subscribe to Smit’s (2006) 
latter view or the sentiment that ‘residents be allowed to choose their own representatives 
and establish direct contact between themselves and the municipality’ (University of the 
Witwatersrand Research Team, 2004b:25). As I will show in chapter 5 of this research 
report, there is a need for decentralisation of decision making to communities through 
participatory mechanisms of the Civic Movement, participatory democracy, and diversity 
of views that serve to enrich debates and ultimate decisions (Huchzermeyer, 2004). 
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In theory, the Municipal Systems Act provides other windows of opportunity that can 
compliment those provided in Chapter 13 of the Code for direct participation in decision-
making processes, a factor which supposedly will enable residents to exercise control 
over matters that affect their lives (Roux, 2004). However, the fact that the role of ward 
committees has been reduced to that of an advisory one limits their powers to represent 
informal settlement dwellers effectively. In addition, lack of remuneration for ward 
committee members except the Ward Councillor serves as another handicap in that very 
few people are prepared for voluntary work in the ward committees. As UN-Habitat 
(2003) has pointed out, ‘local participation should not be an excuse for exploitation’ 
(2003:178). On the contrary, all tasks pertaining to participatory committees ‘should 
involve paid labour’ so as to instil commitment within community members (Ibid).  
 
In order to ‘enable a relationship between municipality and local community, which 
involves consultation and information sharing as well as direct participation in decision-
making’, organisations crafted by residents themselves and the Civic Movement in 
particular, become extremely important (Ibid:53). This is much more so given that the 
Municipal Systems Act provides for community participation of not only all residents of 
the municipality but also ‘any civic organisations and non-governmental, private sector or 
labour organisations or bodies which are involved in local affairs within the 
municipality” (University of the Witwatersrand Team, 2004b: 25). It also provides 
‘residents with a powerful legal basis to insist on meaningful involvement in the 
development process at local level’ Ibid: 26. 
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As argued by Nicholson and Schreiner (1973: 53), community-based organisations 
should insist on good practice which ‘involves a process that supports and strengthens 
these organisations in order to help them become active partners in the upgrading 
process’. In addition, they must exploit the communities’ right to ‘contribute to the 
decision-making processes of the municipality’, and municipalities’ obligation to develop 
a culture of community participation (University of the Witwatersrand Research Team, 
2004b: 68). They must also exploit the municipality’s obligation to establish ‘appropriate 
mechanisms, processes and procedures to enable the local community to participate’ in 
its affairs (Republic of South Africa, 2000: 25). As stated by Jenkins (1999: 444), ‘for 
lower-income population, communal action, whether in the political, social or economic 
realm, permits a scale of activity impossible as individuals’. This will ensure ‘active 
participation in the decision-making process which can continue all the time’ as promoted 
in Chapter 13 of the Code (Nicholson and Schreiner, 1973: 39).  
 
Conclusion 
The pattern of informal settlement formation in South Africa was characterised by 
forceful occupation, be it legal or unlawful. The debates about the Civic Movement 
nationally concerning the loss of key SANCO leaders into public office following the 
first democratic elections of April 1994 and community elections of November 1995, 
attempts to dislodge SANCO from leadership in local politics and the need for alternative 
methods to adapt to a changed political environment capture what obtained locally in 
Lebowakgomo (More illumination of these issues forms the subject of Section 5.1 of this 
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research report). The same can be argued with regards to issues of population densities 
caused by natural growth and rural-urban migration, and spatial configuration of informal 
settlements. The problem of ignoring future installation of water and sewerage systems 
and provision of other services was not an exception as far as allocation of sites by the 
Lebowakgomo Civic Organisation (LCO) was concerned. However, as I will show in 
Section 3.6 of this research report, the local branch of SANCO in Lebowakgomo was 
proactive in that it took into account such factors when allocating sites in Units R and S 
Phase II and III. 
 
The informal settlement intervention from sites and services scheme prior to 1994 and 
upgrading based on capital subsidy mechanism in the first decade of democracy was not a 
people-driven process by the Civic Movement but an externally designed and managed 
process without community participation and empowerment. Chapter 13 of the Code in 
particular, which parallels the Civic Movement approach in Lebowakgomo albeit with 
some minor differences, was designed to address these shortcomings. In summary, as I 
will elaborate in Section 5.2 of this research report, the Civic Movement approach to 
upgrading of the informal settlements of Units R and S Phase II and III in Lebowakgomo 
encompassed what Huchzermeyer (2008) refers to as the indirect and positive component 
of eradication while that of unlawful occupation of Unit R was characterised by what she 
calls the direct and negative side of eradication.  
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Chapter 3 
Background of the study area 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter of the research report is an outline of the status quo of the study area as it 
obtained prior to the new local government dispensation in South Africa up to the year 
2000.  It also serves as a background to the study area with a view to trace the context 
within which the Civic Movement approach emerged and how it impacted on the lives of 
informal settlement dwellers. This outline of the study area will be discussed under the 
following sub-headings: Area of study; physical environment; demographic features, 
social amenities and community facilities; employment and informal activities; 
administration; land invasions; rent and service charges boycott; and evolution of the 
issue of ‘double cap’. 
 
3.2 Area of study 
Lebowakgomo is an R293 Township located at 23 ̊ 59’ 238’’ S, 29 ̊ 27’522’’ E in Limpopo 
Province. The township is situated far from major towns approximately 60km South of 
Polokwane [former Pietersburg] and 63km east of Mokopane [former Potgietersrus] (See 
Appendix A: Map 1) in Limpopo province (TLC Report on Assets, April 1996).  This 
township ‘formed part of the self-governing territory of [former] Lebowa [homeland] 
until 27 April 1994’ (Applicant’s Replying Affidavit, Case number 15562/97:5).  This 
township served as the capital of the former Lebowa homeland and had a strong civic 
presence during the last apartheid years (from 1990) and after the democratic elections of 
1994 up to the year 2000.  The township currently serves as a legislative capital of 
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Limpopo Province. However, for reasons that I will later outline in Chapter 5 of this 
research report, Lebowakgomo is currently having a very weak civic presence. 
 
The Greater Lebowakgomo TLC was established as part of the new dispensation of local 
government through community elections of 1st November 1995. In total, the TLC 
consisted of Lebowakgomo Township and 44 villages. The TLC area of jurisdiction was 
divided into 6 wards. Ward 3 which forms part of the study area, covered Units A, R, S 
Phase I, II and III, BA (Business Area), J, Rustplaas and unoccupied residential sites of 
Units P and Q (See Appendix A: Maps 2-4). Units R and S Phase II and III constituted 
informal settlements that form the main component of the study area (See Appendix A: 
Map 5). 
 
3.3 Physical environment  
The total land surface of Lebowakgomo as of January 1996 was 16 050 hectares with a 
total breakdown of sites as per Table 1 (TLC Report on Assets, April 1996). This 
scenario changed with the belated proclamation of Units R and S as part of 
Lebowakgomo on 17 June 1997. This came as a result of the fact that Unit A was 
proclaimed in 1972, Unit B, C, D and Industrial Area (IA) in 1976 (See Appendix B) 
while the remaining units including E, F, R and S were not ‘proclaimed in the Gazette as 
part of the Lebowakgomo town’ prior to 17 June 1997 (Applicant’s Replying Affidavit, 
Case number 15562/97: 27). The total number of occupied sites during the period 1990-
1995 was 301 and 844 in Units R and S Phase II and III respectively (See Table 1). Prior 
to the community elections of November 1995, the low level zone, i.e., Units A 
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(excluding Rockville and Tleane), R and S derived water from the Chuene dam while the 
high level zone, i.e., units B, F, C, D, E, GA (Government Area) had Lepelle (Olifants 
river) as their source of water supply (See Appendix A: Map 3). There was an acute 
shortage of water for the low level zone ‘due to lack of water capacity of the Chuene 
dam’ (TLC Progress Report for Ward 3, November 1995 – September 1998:1). 
 
Although major bus and taxi routes were tarred in units A and F, they were without taxi 
bays. As was the case in the Apartheid city throughout the country, internal streets were 
not tarred at all. Moreover, Units B, R and S were characterised by gravel bus and taxi 
routes and gravel streets without any form of storm water drainage. 
 
3.4 Demographic features and social amenities and community facilities 
The following demographic features and the state of social amenities and community 
facilities were applicable in Lebowakgomo as of 1996. 
 
3.4.1 Population 
The population size of Lebowakgomo was approximately 50 000 with a population 
growth rate of between 4.5% and 6% (TLC Report on Assets, April 1996). The average 
household size in Lebowakgomo was 4.7 persons. It is probable that the average 
household size of the informal settlements was slightly higher given the fact that the 
majority of informal settlement dwellers were from rural areas where the average 
household size was 5.7 persons (Ibid; also “Sisco” Sehlapelo, Interview, 1.8.2008).  The 
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percentage of the population of a school going age at the time, i.e., 7-18 years, was 31% 
(TLC Report on Assets, April 1996). 
 
The inhabitants of Lebowakgomo could be categorised into two groups, i.e., formal 
residents and informal settlements dwellers.  Formal residents were located in Units A, S 
Phase I, B, F and E while informal settlements dwellers occupied Units BA, R and S 
Phase II and III (See Appendix A: Maps 3 & 5). These two categories of residents could 
further be broken down into the most destitute, working poor and the middle class, i.e., 
civil servants and business entrepreneurs. Units B and F were predominantly occupied by 
the middle class, Units A and S Phase I by members of all income groups, Unit E by the 
working poor while the informal settlements of Units R and S Phase II and III were 
dominated by the working poor and the most destitute (“Weso” Doubada, Interview, 
1.8.2008).    
 
3.4.2 Education facilities 
There were five primary and five high schools, five pre-schools combined with crèches 
and/or nurseries, and one remedial school prior to the community elections of November 
1995 (Baloyi et al., 1994). However, none of these education facilities existed in the 
informal settlements of Units R and S Phase II and III during that period. In addition, 
Lebowakgomo as a whole did not have its own public library. The only library that 
served ‘pupils at secondary school and students at the colleges’ was located at 
Lebowakgomo parliamentary complex situated approximately 12km away from the 
informal settlements of Units R and S Phase II and III (Ibid). Nevertheless, an internal 
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arrangement was made to allow members of the public ‘to make special arrangements to 
loan books’ from this facility (TLC Report on Assets, April 1996: 14). 
 
3.4.3 Health and welfare facilities and emergency services 
A range of welfare services such as pensions and disability grants were provided by the 
South African government through the homeland government of Lebowa during the 
period under discussion, i.e., 1990-2000 (Baloyi et al., 1994). The nearest public 
hospitals prior to the community elections of November 1995 were Groothoek Hospital 
which was later renamed Dr. Machupe Mphahlele Memorial (MMM) and Pietersburg 
Hospital. These hospitals were situated approximately 20km and 60km respectively. 
Thabamoopo Mental Hospital (See Appendix A: Map 5) which served as a rehabilitation 
centre for the general public was situated just outside Unit A (Ibid). Poor health and 
welfare facilities in the public sector served ‘to inhibit attempts to improve the quality of 
life’ of the residents, the working poor and the destitute in particular (TLC Report on 
Assets, 1996: 15). This was complicated by the unaffordable nature of private medical 
practices (which were ten in number as of April 1996) that were only affordable to 
middle and high income groups and those of the working poor who qualified for Medical 
Aid Schemes. 
 
As far as the question of emergency services is concerned, the fire station building that 
was located approximately 20km from the informal settlements of Units R and S Phase II 
and III in Unit Industrial Area (IA), was not utilised for the purpose of emergency 
services prior to the community elections of November 1995. This anomaly can be 
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ascribed to the fact that the person who was supposed to be in charge of it ‘was going [to] 
earn [a] salary higher than that of the Chief Minister of former Lebowa’ (Northern 
District Council Agenda, 15.8.1995: 18). As a result, the fire station building was 
subsequently ‘rented [out] to the [South African] Defence Force’ (SADF) to serve as its 
army base in 1993 (Ibid). The occupation of this building by the army caused untold 
damage to the building and fire station equipment.  In order to make the fire station work 
to their benefit, the community of Lebowakgomo under the leadership of the LCA 
campaigned for the relocation of the army and for the building to be resourced. 
 
3.5 Employment and informal activities 
‘Only few of the economically active persons in Lebowakgomo’ were employed in the 
area, ‘mainly in the public service’ (60%) and the manufacturing sector (19%) as of 1994 
(Baloyi et al., 1994: 44).  The fact that Lebowakgomo is located far from major towns 
meant that a greater percentage of the inhabitants had no choice but to commute daily to 
Polokwane (former Pietersburg) and Mokopane (former Potgietersrus) ‘to work in 
industry, commerce and services’ (Ibid: 41).  Of those employed in the retail sector, half 
were ‘employed by establishments selling durable goods and the rest by cafe’s and 
restaurants’ (TLC Report on Assets, April 1996: 2).  In addition, ‘approximately a third 
of all workers were migrants with male absenteeism of 29%’ (Ibid). Of workers 
employed in Lebowakgomo, professionals and clerks constituted 36% and 31% 
respectively (TLC Report on Assets, April 1996).  The unemployment rate was very high 
in the informal settlements of Units R, S Phase II and III and BA (See “Sisco” Sehlapelo, 
Interview, 1.8.2008). 
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For purposes of livelihoods, unemployed households engaged themselves in informal 
economic activities such as ‘market stalls, spaza shops, fruit and vegetable vendoring, 
plumbing, [and] panel-beating’ as well as shebeens (Baloyi et al., 1994:44).  These 
activities occurred ‘at home, on street corners and, of course, occupying shop verandas’, 
at main entrances to public institutions and shopping centres as well as taxi ranks (Ibid). 
Some hawkers specialised in the sale of staple food, mainly porridge and meat. Informal 
trading areas that specialised in the sale of staple food were popularly referred to as 
“Bush Hotels” (“Weso” Doubada, Interview, 1.8.2008). The bulk of informal traders at 
the main entrances to public institutions such as the Magistrate Offices and parliamentary 
complex, shopping centres and taxi ranks were residents of unit A and the informal 
settlements of Units R and S Phase II and III (Ibid).   
 
3.6 Land invasions 
The formation of the LCA in 1990 was prompted by the prevailing housing backlog in 
Lebowakgomo, arbitrary and exorbitant increase in rent and service charges as well as the 
desire to render the country ungovernable (LCA Secretariat Report, March 1994). The 
Civic Movement led the homeless to invade pegged empty sites without basic services in 
Unit S Phase II and III in 1991 and serviced sites in Unit R in 1994. Prior to the LCA-led 
invasion of Unit S Phase II and III in 1991, the bulk of the people who constituted the 
homeless were occupants of backyard rooms who migrated from the rural areas to 
Lebowakgomo in search of social and economic opportunities (“Weso” Doubada, 
Interview, 1.8.2008). The same prospects prompted other people from the rural areas, 
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those with relatives and friends in the township in particular, to flock to Lebowakgomo 
during the time of the LCA-led land invasion of Unit S Phase II and III in 1991 and Unit 
R in 1994 (“Sisco” Sehlapelo, Interview, 1.8.2008). It should be stated from the outset 
that the LCA-led invasion invasion of Unit S Phase II and III in 1991 was undertaken 
with consent from the then Town Manager, Mr. Molepo (Ibid). However, the LCA-led 
invasion of Unit R was in protest against the unilateral allocation of residential sites by 
the office of the Town Manager in 1994 and was, therefore, effected without consent 
from the authorities. 
 
Overall, the informal settlements of Units R and S Phase II and III in Lebowakgomo 
resulted from a form of ‘planned invasion’ and, therefore, were fairly well laid out with 
large plots measuring between 450m2 and 800m2. Initially, these sites were earmarked for 
delivery of higher income housing by the erstwhile government of Lebowa. As a result, 
they were extremely well suited for in situ upgrading, in fact upgrading was already 
envisaged at the time of invasion.  However, this is not necessarily representative of 
informal settlements elsewhere. Many informal settlements in and around Johannesburg 
are extremely dense and constantly densifying. As UN-Habitat (2006) puts it, ‘population 
densities and spatial configuration of slums [or informal settlements] often do not allow 
for the development of the roads, sewerage systems and other facilities that may be easier 
to install in less dense and better planned areas’ (2006: 47). This is complicated by the 
presence of shack lordism whereby tenants rent shacks from shack owners. Chapter 13 of 
the Code was consciously designed for this far more complex type of informal settlement, 
often on unsuitable land. 
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The expansion of informal settlements in Lebowakgomo was regulated and guided by the 
Civic Movement. During the LCA-led invasions in Units R and S Phase II and III, 
households were requested by the LCA not to erect permanent dwelling structures 
pending the outcome of the civic engagement with the authorities (“Sisco” Sehlapelo, 
Interview, 1.8.2008). In addition, they were requested to take cognisance of ‘open spaces 
reserved for streets and pedestrian paths or access’ (Baloyi et al., 1994:44).  The aim was 
to avoid expensive demolition of permanent housing structures in case of installation of 
engineering services and encroachment to open spaces in Unit S Phase II and III and to 
await the outcome of double allocation of sites in Unit R. In order to curb land 
speculation and the abuse of residential sites, the following conditions were set by the 
local branch of SANCO as the criteria for site allocation: 
An Applicant for residential site had to be 30 years of age or more, neither have a 
site nor a house in Lebowakgomo, had to erect a temporary structure on the 
allocated site lest no deed of grant could be issued, and had to possess an 
identification document such as an ID or Passport (LCA Application Form for a 
site, Undated). 
 
The Lebowakgomo Civic Organisation (LCO), a rival civic to the SANCO-affiliated 
LCA, led the invasion of pegged but unserviced sites in Unit R as from 6 April 1997 
(Applicant’s Replying Affidavit, Case number 15562/97). Unlike the LCA or local 
branch of SANCO before it, the LCO-led land occupation was not done with any consent 
from the authorities. The LCO cited as reasons for the illegal allocation or occupation of 
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land in Unit R the question of ‘double cab’, i.e., the Chairperson of the TLC remaining 
the Chairperson of SANCO, alleged continued allocation of sites by SANCO as opposed 
to the TLC, alleged corruption in the allocation of sites, corruption in construction of 
RDP houses and double allocation of sites in Unit R which were said to prejudice some 
residents (Ibid). 
 
3.7 Rent and service charges boycott 
Rates and taxes were never applied in Lebowakgomo until the present day.  The only fees 
that were applicable in the early 1990s were house rent, water, electricity, service charges 
for maintenance of water and electricity infrastructure, sale of sites, registration of sites, 
and fees for the use of cemetery, civic hall and sports field (TLC Report on Assets, April 
1996). Payment for rent was R6, refuse removal R2, electricity service charge R6 and 
general service charge R2.10 (Ibid). Payment for water and electricity was based on 
household consumption with provision for a flat rate of R3 per household with faulty 
water metres or no metres at all (Ibid). As I have earlier pointed out, the rent and service 
charges boycott was precipitated by arbitrary and exorbitant increase in rent and service 
charges. The rent and service charges boycott was led by Lebowakgomo Civic 
Association (LCA) and was supported by the majority of residents including business 
entrepreneurs. The situation was exacerbated by the gutting of the Superintendent Offices 
in Unit A on the eve of the first democratic elections of April 1994 by some residents 
who were probably threatened by arrears pertaining to rent and service charges as a result 
of the boycott.  
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3.8 Administration and governance 
Prior to the formation in 1990 of the LCA, which in 1992 became the local branch of 
SANCO; Lebowakgomo was administered by the Town Council through the Town 
Manager’s office, i.e., the Town Manager and two superintendents, one for Unit A Office 
and the other for Unit F Office. The Superintendent Office for Unit A was responsible for 
Units A, R, and S while that of Unit F was responsible for Units BA, B, F and E. 
Immediately after its formation, the LCA ‘successfully brought the council system to its 
virtual collapse’ by forcing Councillors to resign en masse in 1990-1 (Ibid).  The 
township was thus rendered ungovernable with the result that only the Town Manager 
and the two superintendents administered it until March 1993 (Applicant’s Replying 
Affidavit, Case number 15562/97). Between 1993 and November 1995, the township was 
co-governed by the Town Manager’s Office and the local branch of SANCO through the 
Implementation Forum (IF). 
 
‘The 1995 Local Government elections gave birth to Greater Lebowakgomo TLC which 
consisted of 9 Councillors’, i.e., 6 Ward and 3 Proportional Representation (PR) 
Councillors (TLC Progress Report on Three Years of Local Government Administration, 
1.11.1995 – 1.11.1998: 1).  In addition, these elections ushered in key civic leaders into 
the TLC through the Tripartite Alliance Plus One (ANC-SACP-COSATU Alliance plus 
SANCO) albeit under an ANC ticket.  The Chairperson of the local branch of SANCO in 
Lebowakgomo was elected Councillor for Ward 3, Chairperson of the TLC and TLC 
Representative (Rep) in the Northern District Council (NDC). The TLC ‘started 
functioning from the beginning of 1996’ (Applicant’s Replying Affidavit, Case number 
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15562/97: 9).  Henceforth, the area was administered by the SANCO-inspired TLC with 
the Town Manager’s Office as its administrative wing up to the year 2000. 
 
Prior to the new dispensation, the administrative seat of the town was based at 
Lebowakgomo Civic Centre in Unit BA.  The LCA operated from offices allocated for 
free by two local business entrepreneurs, i.e., Messrs. Victor Sithole (Mohlapa Garage) 
and Monamodi (Dandy Dry Cleaners). After the community elections of November 1995, 
the administrative seat remained at Lebowakgomo Civic Centre with the Town Manager 
and two superintendents at the helm of the administration (TLC Hand-Over Report to 
Lepelle-Nkumpi Municipality, 2000). The SANCO-inspired TLC appointed “Sisco” 
Sehlapelo who was both the Administrator and Deputy Chairperson of the local branch of 
SANCO as the TLC Administrator immediately after its inception. The aim was to stamp 
the authority of local public representatives on the Administrative staff and to ensure 
smooth coordination between the political and administrative wings of the TLC.  
 
As I will show in the socio-economic and political components of the Civic Movement 
approach, the local branch of SANCO effectively utilised leaders it deployed into the 
TLC through the community elections of November 1995 to advance the interests of 
residents, particularly the inhabitants of the informal settlements of Units R and S Phase 
II and III. In addition, SANCO utilised its community participation mechanisms (to 
which I turn in the next section) to empower dwellers to partake effectively in matters 
that had a direct bearing on their lives. Therefore, contrary to Seekings’ (1997) assertion 
that ordinary people became alienated from the civics as they began to see activists as 
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self-serving, more and more residents of Lebowakgomo associated themselves with the 
local branch of SANCO even after the 1995 community elections up to 1998.  
 
3.9 Community participation mechanisms 
 Like the rest of SANCO branches nationally, the local branch of SANCO in 
Lebowakgomo relied on street, block and general mass meetings as mechanisms of 
community participation. The vertical and horizontal representative structure of the Civic 
Movement in the form of street, block and Branch Executive Committee (BEC) 
committees enhanced meaningful community contributions. Community members were 
co-opted into sub-committees of SANCO in order to address community issues in an 
efficient manner and to maximise community involvement. 
 
Residents in general were ‘supplied with a schedule of [monthly], street, block and 
general mass meetings and were timeously reminded of such meetings’ by the local 
branch of SANCO and its street and block committees (SANCO Secretariat Report, 
14.11. 1999 to 30.6.2001). Notices of general mass meetings were channelled through 
‘churches, schools, vendors, taxi associations and trade associations [all of] which played 
a major role in ensuring dissemination of information’ (Ibid). Community engagement 
through a decentralised system of street and block committees coupled with general mass 
meetings and sub-committees of the Civic Movement served as effective means of 
community participation. 
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Faced with ‘the collapse of essential services and huge sums of money in arrears owed by 
the community’ as a result of the rent and service charges boycott and, against the 
background of calls for total vis-à-vis part scrapping of arrears, the SANCO-inspired 
TLC resolved on ‘payment of a flat rate of R48.40 for the period February-May 1994’ 
(TLC Chairperson’s Address earmarked for Chairpersons/Mayors for Masakhane, 
28.6.1996: 5). This flat rate amount was arrived at by adding standard service charges for 
the period February-May 1994 as ‘a) R1.00 – Refuse Removal, b) R6.00 – Electricity 
Service Charges, c) R2.10 – General Service Charge, d) R3.00 – Water Consumption’ 
(Ibid).  
 
Although the issue of arrears and resumption of payment for rent and service charges was 
finally resolved on 19 May 1996, the actual debate by the community commenced in 
January 1996 and continued unabated at well attended monthly mass meetings convened 
by the local branch of SANCO. This followed the adoption of the Masakhane Campaign 
by the South African government in May 1995. The aim of Masakhane was two-fold; 
firstly, to end the rent and bond boycotts with a view to restore and inculcate the culture 
of payment for services, and secondly, to ensure delivery of services. Therefore, the 
dominant theme of the Masakhane Campaign was that residents should resume payment 
for services ‘if there is to be provision of better services’ (Times, 16.2.1996). Active 
community involvement was identified as a key pillar for the success of the campaign. In 
order to get the buy-in of the TLCs in the Masakhane project, the national government 
scrapped arrears for the rent and service charges up to January 1994 (Ibid).  In addition, 
the Masakhane Awards were introduced.  The criteria for TLCs to scoop the Masakhane 
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Awards were community participation, community education fame, payment level, 
service delivery, development projects fame, an efficient ward system, local development 
fame and completion of many schemes (Criteria for Award, Undated). 
 
SANCO also entered into tactical, strategic and principled alliances with other structures 
across the socio-economic and political spectrum as dictated by material conditions on 
the ground from time to time. As was the case at national level, the local branch of 
SANCO entered into the principled alliance based on the Freedom Charter with the 
ANC-led Tripartite Alliance to improve the lives of residents. It also entered into tactical 
and strategic alliances with other structures through the All Structures meetings where 
various structures representing political organisations, businesses, churches, informal 
traders, trade unions and taxi associations participated. This served to deepen the culture 
of mandates and report backs and thereby, entrenched principles of community-driven 
process and community-centred development. 
 
The TLC also engaged the community in matters that affected their well being through 
information dissemination audio cassettes entitled ‘Democracy in Action: Lebowakgomo 
TLC’ to the general public and distribution of Christmas presents (in the form toys and 
firecrackers) to children under the age of 12 in the informal settlements of Units R and S 
Phase II and III and hosting of functions in celebration of completed projects in 1996 and 
1997 (See “Appendix I”). Monitoring, evaluation and reporting on the impact of the 
information dissemination audio cassettes (which were distributed through local taxis) at 
the community level were adopted as part of the broader strategy to assess the impact of 
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community outreach on the residents. The distribution of Christmas presents not only 
‘created a healthy atmosphere of the festive season among children who never had access 
to toys’ and other social amenities before but also served as a signal that children and 
their parents were recognised as citizens of Lebowakgomo by the TLC (Ibid). 
 
3.10 Evolution of the issue of ‘double cap’  
As was the case in the rest of the country, the local branch of SANCO in Lebowakgomo 
was affected by the exodus of its key leaders into public office following the first 
democratic elections of April 1994 and community elections of November 1995. Kamela 
Phineas Sekonya (Ex-Officio member of the branch and President of the Northern 
Transvaal Region in 1994) was elected into the provincial legislature, Chuene William 
Rammutla (President of the branch and Secretary of the Northern Transvaal Region in 
1994) was absorbed into the civil service and Ponele Richard Seshai (Treasurer of the 
branch in 1994) was promoted into a high post in the Department of Justice. It should be 
noted that provincial structures of SANCO were referred to as regions and Chairpersons 
at all levels of the organisation including branches as Presidents prior to the democratic 
elections of 1994. In addition, this author (Chairperson of the branch who replaced 
Chuene Rammutla following the latter’s absorption into the civil service in 1994, and 
Deputy Secretary of the Northern Transvaal Region in 1995) was elected as Councillor 
for Ward 3, TLC Chairperson (a position equivalent to that of the Mayor) and TLC 
Representative (Rep) in the Northern District Council (NDC) while Mashilo Jonas 
“Sisco” Sehlapelo (an Administrator who was also the Deputy Chairperson of the branch 
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at the time) was absorbed into the TLC and Provincial Housing Board (PHB) as an 
Administrator and member respectively.  
 
While the former category of SANCO cadres except Kamela Sekonya were lost from the 
Civic Movement for good, the latter, i.e., this author and “Sisco” Sehlapelo retained their 
positions in SANCO.  This approach was strengthened by the resolution, by SANCO at 
national level in February 1997, to allow the issue of ‘double cap’, i.e., elected 
Councillors, Members of Provincial Legislature (MPLs) of Members of Parliament 
(MPs) holding office in SANCO structures (See “Sisco” Sehlapelo, Interview, 1.8.2008). 
This move was aimed at addressing the problem of leadership vacuum caused by the 
exodus of SANCO leaders into public office at all levels of the organisation (Ibid). This 
policy shift meant that SANCO could retain its key leaders while grooming the new 
leadership (Ibid). In the case of Lebowakgomo, this policy directive enabled Kamela 
Sekonya to ascend to the national executive committee of SANCO while retaining his 
position as an MPL. In addition, this author retained his positions as the Chairperson of 
both the local branch of SANCO and the TLC while Sisco Sehlapelo retained his as the 
Deputy Chairperson of the local branch of SANCO and TLC Administrator as well as 
PHB member. Further, this policy shift empowered the local branch of SANCO to adopt 
the use of ‘double cap’ (retaining positions in SANCO while occupying positions in 
government) as a strategy to advance the interests of residents without loosing control of 
SANCO at the local level. This strategy gave rise to a fierce conflict over control of the 
Civic Movement at the local level (more illumination on this issue appears in Chapter 5 
of this research report).  
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Although the deployment of key leaders into administrative and political positions in 
government created a leadership vacuum within the Civic Movement throughout the 
country, the local branch of SANCO was an exception because it successfully employed 
the controversial strategy of ‘double cap’ to advance the interests of residents in general 
and informal settlement dwellers of Units R and S Phase II and III in particular. This 
contradicts Seekings’s (1997) and Zuern’s (2006) assertion that experienced leaders of 
SANCO were co-opted into government structures to serve the interests of the ruling 
elite. On the contrary, these local leaders conceived their participation in government 
structures as consolidation of the arena of struggle to ameliorate the lives of residents in 
general and informal settlement inhabitants in particular. This can be attributed to the fact 
that the local branch of SANCO maximised the deployment of its cadres into the TLC 
through the community elections of November 1995 to enhance upgrading of informal 
settlements of Units R and S Phase II and III. However, this approach aroused a bitter 
conflict over control of such deployees between the local branches of SANCO and the 
ANC. As I will vividly show in Chapter 5, the leadership of the local branch of the ANC 
embarked on a campaign to dislodge the local branch of SANCO from the leadership in 
and influence over local politics as early as March 1996. 
 
Conclusion 
It is clear from the background outlined above that the study area lacked engineering 
services, social amenities and services as well as community facilities at the time of the 
LCA-led land invasion in Unit S Phase II and III in 1990. It also emerged that urban-rural 
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linkages played a dominant role in the occupation of the informal settlements of Units S 
Phase II and III in 1990 and R in 1994. These informal settlement areas were not 
proclaimed as part of Lebowakgomo, a factor which was corrected by the LCO-led 
invasion of Unit R as reflected in Section 5.3 of this research report. In addition, the issue 
of ‘double cap’ engendered bitter conflict for control of the Civic Movement between the 
local branches of the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC) of Azania and Azanian People’s 
Organisation (AZAPO) and the ANC-aligned LCA. The informal settlements of Units S 
Phase II and III and R were also characterised by main gravel roads which were supposed 
to serve as bus and taxi routes and internal streets without any form of water drainage 
system. In addition, they were characterised by acute shortage of water, high levels of 
unemployment and poverty. The question posed by this background of this research 
report is how were these issues that impacted negatively on the lives of informal 
settlement dwellers addressed? The answer to this question lies in the Civic Movement 
approach that forms the main discussion of Chapter 4 (to which I turn next) and Chapter 
5 of this research report. 
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Chapter 4 
Socio-economic component of the Civic Movement approach 
4.1 Introduction 
The comparison and contrast between Chapter 13 of the Code and the Civic Movement 
approach exhibits similarities and differences between the two approaches. On the one 
hand, the socio-economic component of the Civic Movement approach that forms our 
discussion in this Chapter of the research report is identical in many respects with major 
tenets of Chapter 13 of the Code.  On the other hand, the community participation aspect 
that constitutes part of the political component of the Civic Movement approach (to 
which I turn in Chapter 5) shows glaring differences while the eradication of informal 
settlements aspect reveals both similarities and differences between Chapter 13 of the 
Code and the Civic Movement approach.  As I have already sketched an overview of 
Chapter 13 of the Code in Chapter 2 of this research report, it is now relevant to 
interrogate the socio-economic component of the Civic Movement approach in this 
Chapter of the research report and later its political component in Chapter 5. This will 
help us to draw a better comparison between the housing policy document on upgrading 
of informal settlements and the advocacy approach of the Civic Movement. 
 
This Chapter sets out similarities between the two approaches by exploring issues of 
secure tenure, social amenities and community facilities, social services, and housing. 
Engineering services, roads and storm water drainage, parks and open spaces as well as 
domestic energy and community lighting will form the component of the discussion on 
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social amenities. Public schools and the library, the hospital and clinic as well as 
emergency services will be scrutinised as the component of social services.   
 
4.2 Secure tenure   
As highlighted in the previous chapter of this research report, planned land occupation 
with consent from the Town Manager, Mr. Molepo, meant that the inhabitants of the 
informal settlement of Unit S Phase II and III enjoyed secure tenure from the very 
beginning. This served to protect informal settlements dwellers from being threatened 
with eviction by the authorities. This was complemented by the installation of water pipes 
and communal taps in every street in Unit S phase II except for Phase III (“Sisco” 
Sehlapelo, Interview, 1.8.2008). Although the inhabitants of Unit S Phase III were forced 
to gather water from the nearest communal taps in Unit S Phase II, the installation of 
communal taps was itself identical in approach with provision of temporary engineering 
services as contained in Chapter 13 of the Code. The difference is that provision was not 
made for temporary sanitation services in the case of Unit S Phase II and III. Of 
importance is that funding designated for this purpose was derived from the Town 
Manager’s Office through pressure from the Civic Movement.  
 
After the Town Manager reneged on an agreement to install essential services in Unit S 
Phase II and III, the residents of Lebowakgomo under the leadership of the LCA resolved 
to embark upon a 5-day stay-at-home protest on 2 February 1993. This stay away was 
preceded by a protest march to the Bantustan government of Lebowa in pursuit of 
demands which cut across all residents, formal and informal. These demands included the 
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transfer of the Town Manager; immediate stoppage of servicing of erven in Unit R; 
immediate servicing of Unit S Phase II and III; development of parks; provision of 
clinics, one in Unit R and the other in unit F; erection of primary and secondary schools 
in unit S; and creation of posts for unemployed and newly qualified teachers. These 
demands except the latter can be said to be more or less similar to the current Phases 1 to 
3 of upgrading of informal settlements as incorporated in Chapter 13 of the Code which 
covers ‘access to land, basic municipal engineering services and social amenities and 
services’ and community facilities (Department of Housing, 2004b: 9). This approach 
serves to illustrate the importance of the role of the Civic Movement as a centre of power 
for all communities as opposed to an organisation that only represents the interests of 
informal settlement dwellers. 
 
With regards to the call by the LCA for the removal of the Town Manager from 
Lebowakgomo, the Civic Movement targeted the Town Manager’s office because it was 
this office that was ‘delegated significant degree of authority’ as far as ‘housing and 
service provision’ was concerned (Baloyi et al., 1994: 45).  According to the structure of 
former Lebowa Department of Home Affairs, the needs of the community were identified 
and prioritised by the Town Manager and the two superintendents (Baloyi et al., 1994). 
These needs and priorities were then despatched to the Department for finalisation and 
funding. This brought the Town Manager’s office into a collision course with the Civic 
Movement. The LCA held ‘the Town Manager and the superintendents responsible for 
the poor conditions in the township’ (Ibid: 45). It should be noted that the Civic 
Movement existed as an alternative to the collapsed town council in line with calls for 
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advancement of organs of people’s power in every sphere (See “Weso” Doubada, 
Interview, 1.8.2008).  This was in line with the objective of Chapter 13 of the Code that 
seeks to empower ‘informal settlement inhabitants to take charge of their own 
development’ (Department of Housing, 2004b: 3). 
 
The stay-at-home protest was so successful that the cabinet of former Lebowa capitulated 
to the bulk of the demands of the residents of Lebowakomo as represented by the LCA. 
Among other demands on which the LCA scored a victory for informal settlement 
dwellers were installation of engineering services, primary and secondary schools in Unit 
S and a clinic in Unit R.  Other indirect benefits were an agreement for joint allocation of 
sites, creation of 2 320 teachers’ posts and reinstatement of expelled SADTU (South 
African Democratic Teachers Union) members to their teaching posts.  An agreement for 
installation of engineering services and provision of primary and secondary schools in 
Unit S and a clinic in Unit R underlines the importance of meaningful community 
participation in addressing issues that affects the lives of the inhabitants of informal 
settlements through the Civic Movement as opposed to a committee appointed by and 
responsible solely to informal settlements dwellers. Installation of engineering services 
through funding from the Department of Home Affairs enhanced regularisation of the 
informal settlements of Unit S Phase II and III.  
 
Regularisation of the informal settlement of Unit S Phase II and III was further 
consolidated through a concession by the authorities to issue deeds of grant to informal 
settlement dwellers. The payment schedule and mechanism in the form of down payment 
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of R195 and the monthly interest-free instalment fee of R4.10 spread over a period of 30 
years towards the total site cost of R1 400 were endorsed at street, block and general 
mass meetings held under the auspices of the local branch of SANCO. This confirms that 
meaningful community participation is essential for regularisation of informal settlements 
and other upgrading activities. This approach is being promoted under Chapter 13 of the 
Code. The difference is that Chapter 13 of the Code provides funding for promotion of 
participation whereas the Civic Movement approach relied on its meagre resources and 
political consciousness of the residents. No funding was made available for site 
purchases. Although it consolidated ownership, titling through deeds of grant which was 
a lesser ownership title to freehold title attracted service charges. This was similar to the 
current conception by Chapter 13 of the Code that individual freehold title ‘also attracts 
rates and taxes’ (Department of Housing, 2004b: 30). For a more understanding of the 
difference between deeds of grant and full title refer to Appendix B. 
 
Those who did not manage to assemble the deposit towards purchase of their stands 
neither could on their own decide to sell the sites they occupied nor access benefits such 
as access to dustbins and refuse removal. The inability to decide to sell their properties on 
their own accord confirms the conception of Chapter 13 of the Code that ‘co-
operative/Group ownership confers limited use rights’ to residents (Ibid).  However, 
reluctance to contribute deposits necessary for purchase of sites on the part of some 
dwellers through instigation by the local branch of SANCO confirms the view that access 
to land is sufficient means of secure tenure for the households concerned.  It also relieved 
them from the cycle of payment for services that usually characterises ownership title. 
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4.3 Social amenities and community facilities 
Engineering services, roads and stormwater drainage, domestic energy and community 
lightning as well as parks and open spaces were social amenities and community facilities 
that were developed through the Civic Movement approach.  It is to the discussion of 
these issues that I now turn.  
 
4.3.1 Engineering services 
With the inception of SANCO-aligned TLC, identification and prioritisation of 
community needs was done by the TLC with strong influence from SANCO.  The Civic 
Movement viewed the TLC as a vehicle through which election promises that were made 
by the Tripartite Alliance Plus One during campaigns for 1st November 1995 local 
government elections could be realised.  Among these election promises were constant 
availability of water supply, tarred bus routes and internal streets, erection of Lafata 
primary and Kopano secondary schools in Unit S, provision of a fully fledged clinic in 
Unit R, more serviced sites, recreation facilities and job creation (LCA Local 
Government Manifesto, 1995). 
 
The TLC ensured that the residents of the low level zone got ‘their water from the main 
Olifants river water pipeline and, thereby, abandoned the Chuene dam as a source of 
water supply due to its [un]reliability’ during 1997 (TLC Progress Report on Three Years 
of Local Government Administration, 1.11. 1995-1.11.1998: 2). It was through the bulk 
water supply to the low level zone that the informal settlements of Unit R and S Phase II 
and III ‘were provided with adequate and constant water supply’ to address the problem 
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of periodic water shortages (SANCO Application/Request for Donation and/or Financial 
Assistance, Undated: 1). This meant that although the informal settlements of Unit R and 
S Phase II and III were provided with internal water and sewer reticulation in 1993, the 
majority of the inhabitants from these informal settlements started to fully enjoy the 
benefits of access to water and proper sanitation four years later. 
 
At the beginning of 1998, the TLC replaced the oxidation pond system with a new 
Wastewater Treatment plant that was constructed south of Unit A to alleviate the problem 
of sewerage ponds that were already in a state of overflow (TLC Progress Report on 
Three Years of Local Government Administration, 1.11.1995 –1.11.1998). This problem 
was aggravated by the loading on the ponds from additional sewerage that was generated 
from the informal settlements of Units R and S Phase II and III. The new project was 
envisaged to accommodate ’14 700 erven (± 100,000 people)’ with a ‘design lifetime of 
twenty years’ (Ibid).  This design was earmarked to accommodate the whole of 
Lebowakgomo including the additional 2 345 low-cost housing units and 1 010 middle 
income houses that were about to be developed in Units R and S Phase II and III and Unit 
P respectively (Report on Extension of the Northern Collector Sewer, June 1998).  The 
new Wastewater Treatment works was also coupled with ‘the construction of the bulk 
sewer pipeline for unit[s] A, R and S’ (TLC Progress Report for Ward 3, November 1995 
– September 1998: 3). From the planning point of view, the approach of the SANCO-
aligned TLC differed from that conceptualised in Chapter 13 of the Code in that it 
considered provision of water and sewer on the long term basis with current and future 
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development in mind. This type of planning served to reduce poverty of the soil and to 
generate economic opportunities for the local community. 
 
4.3.2 Roads and storm water drainage 
Other than provision of water and sanitation, bus routes were tarred with storm water 
drainage characterised by side inlets in order to reduce costs associated with sub-surface 
piping in Unit S Phase II and III during 1997. Gravel internal streets were also graded 
and shaped with a necessary cross fall against the natural slope to serve as cut off 
channels. Upgrading of bus and taxi routes was in line with provision of engineering 
services as conceptualised in Chapter 13 of the Code. Tarred bus routes and streets and 
graded and shaped internal streets uplifted the standards of roads and streets and 
upgraded the storm water drainage system. This improved the internal transport system 
such that buses and taxis began to reach areas that were previously inaccessible by road. 
However, lack of a taxi rank within the informal settlements meant that dwellers were 
still forced to walk up to 4 Km to access taxis and buses to far flung places at the 
undeveloped taxi rank in Unit A (Ibid). Lack of a taxi rank, therefore, militated against 
the area from serving as a transport hub necessary for the well being of residents as 
conceptualised in Chapter 13 of the Code. 
 
4.3.3 Domestic energy supply and community lighting 
The TLC in conjunction with the Department of Local Government and Traditional 
Affairs supplied bulk electricity with internal reticulation and high mast lights in Units R 
and S Phase II and III through overhead cables during 1996/97 financial year (TLC 
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Progress Report on Three Years of Local Government Administration, 1.11.1995-
1.11.1998). The residents of the informal settlements of in Units R and S Phase II and III 
vigorously protested against overhead cables which they termed “washing lines” during 
installation and demanded underground cables instead from the TLC. It was the 
contention of these residents that overhead cables not only posed danger during times of 
storms but also threatened the value of their properties. It appears that the protest by the 
said residents was informed by the need to maintain existing design standards to avoid 
any form of discrimination, an aspect which is ignored in Chapter 13 of the Code. It was 
also an attempt to input on the design over a project that affected their lives, a factor 
which was in line with the current provisions of Chapter 13 of the Code. The residents’ 
approach implicitly posed the question as to what local authorities need to do in the face 
of financial constraints and maintenance of standards. Do they need to lower the 
standards to reduce the cost of supply or to maintain standards and raise rates and service 
charges? This dilemma is an area that needs further research to resolve.  
 
The other issue that the informal settlement inhabitants were opposed to was the 
connection fee of R225 and the ready board fee of R400 which amounted to a total of 
R625. Dwellers demanded a single connection fee of R50 inclusive of the ready board as 
per ESKOM rates in rural villages. As I have indicated in Chapter 3 in this research 
report, the majority of the residents had rural ties. This is precisely why they linked the 
overhead design with ESKOM design in rural areas. The problem was that the 
Department of Local Government and Traditional Affairs contracted a private contractor, 
Schlebusch Electrical Consultants, to install electricity along the ESKOM design of 
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overhead cables and ready boards without inputs from the TLC and/or SANCO on the 
design concept. In addition, Schlebusch Electrical Consultants neither involved residents 
in the design nor took into account the affordability levels of informal settlement dwellers 
before the firm could embark on installation of electricity in Units R and S Phase II and 
III. This approach contradicts the current provisions of Chapter 13 of the Code. 
 
The dispute around the electricity design and connection fee propelled residents of the 
informal settlements of Units R and S Phase II and III to constitute their own 
representative structure named the Concerned Action Committee during November 1996 
(Applicant’s Replying Affidavit, Case number 15562/97). The purpose of the Action 
Committee was to resolve a dispute with the TLC ‘about the amount of connection fees 
that had to be paid in respect of electricity of Lebowakgomo town’ as well as the 
overhead electricity design that was rejected by informal settlement dwellers in favour of 
an underground one. (Ibid: 13). The issue of ‘double cap’ also ‘contributed immensely to 
the emergence of the Concerned Action Committee’ (Ibid: 3). This was much more so 
given that the Chairperson of the TLC who was also the local Chairperson of SANCO 
and Councillor for Ward 3 ‘instructed the residents of S and R that they should pay R225 
+ R400 or pack and go to the rural areas’ where the connection fee was R50 (Tripartite 
Alliance Commission of Enquiry Report: Undated: 1). Consequently, the ‘residents of S 
and R did not see any difference between SANCO as their mouthpiece and Council as the 
governing body’ (Ibid). 
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The issue of ‘double cap’ forced the president of SANCO at the time, Mlungisi 
Hlongwane, to forsake his position as the Mayor of Lekoa/Vaal TLC in favour of 
retaining the presidency of SANCO in 1997 (“Sisco” Sehlapelo, Interview, 1.8.2008).  
The question is as to whether a leader of the Civic Movement should resign his/her civic 
position immediately he/she ascends to higher political office in government.  To me, the 
answer to this question depends on the quality of the leader in question. The 
Lebowakgomo experience has shown that the quality of the local leadership of the Civic 
Movement generated a host of benefits for residents by maintaining the question of 
‘double cap’. This was made possible by the fact that the leaders concerned originated 
from the informal settlement of Unit S Phase II and III and, therefore, had the interests of 
the informal settlement dwellers at heart. 
 
At a meeting of the Concerned Action Committee on 2 February 1997, Jack Mamphuti 
Phala and Moss Mphahlele of the local branches of the Pan African Congress (PAC) and 
Azanian People’s Organisation (AZAPO) respectively, ‘proposed a resolution of no 
confidence in the executive committee of the local SANCO branch also known as the 
Lebowakgomo Civic Association’ (Applicant’s Replying Affidavit, Case number 
15562/97: 14). ‘This resolution was not passed and the chairperson, Mr. [Johannes] 
Lekgothoane, ruled that [the] purpose of the action committee was simply to address the 
electricity problem and that it was not to be used for political purposes or challenge the 
[local] leadership of SANCO’ (Ibid).  The resolution passed at the Concerned Action 
Committee meeting on 2 February 1997 confirms the view that residents of informal 
settlements should be represented by the Civic Movement and only constitute their own 
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committee for specific issues of a project nature lest they risk loosing the leverage 
(power) of the Civic Movement. It also shows that once they constitute their own 
committee, they should maintain their independence and resist any attempts to hijack 
them from their own course or to pursue petty political interests. In this way, they stand a 
good chance to engage in effective community participation for their own benefit. 
 
The issues of electricity connection fee, the optional nature of the ready boards and the 
electricity design were clarified through supportive documentation at a meeting between 
the Concerned Action Committee and the Town Manager, Elphia Moloto, in March 1997. 
After this meeting, the R225 connection fee, the optional nature of the ready boards and 
the electricity design were endorsed as appropriate by informal settlement dwellers at a 
report back meeting held under the auspices of the Concerned Action Committee towards 
the end of 1997 (Applicant’s Replying Affidavit, Case number 15562/97). This 
underlined the need for effective community engagement as provided in Chapter 13 of 
the Code. It also brought closure to the chapter of the Action Committee and ushered in 
the formation of the Lebowakgomo Civic Organisation (LCO) which I will discuss in the 
next chapter of this research report. 
 
As for the question of high mast lights, two were installed in Unit R, six in Unit S Phase 
II and III, one at Unit A Taxi rank and the other at Mathumetja Shopping Centre in Unit 
A while one existing high mast light in Unit S Phase I was repaired. This meant that 
informal settlement dwellers of Units R and S Phase II and III ‘could enjoy benefits that 
go with community lighting’ for the first time (TLC Progress Report on Three Years of 
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Local Government Administration, 1.11.1995-1.11.1998: 3). This was in line with the 
vision of Chapter 13 of the Code for the provision of ‘lighting in key areas to enhance 
community safety and access to emergency vehicles’ (Department of Housing, 2004b: 
14). This also had a positive impact on parks and open spaces to which I turn below. 
 
4.3.4 Parks and open spaces 
The Clean and Green Campaign project was initiated in Lebowakgomo in April 1997 
This project was a partnership between the TLC and the National Department of Public 
Works in association with the South African Breweries (SAB) to clean and green the 
environment and to transform parks from being hideouts for criminals into recreational 
facilities (Letter from TLC Chairperson to Chief Director for the Department of Local 
Government and Traditional Affairs, Undated). The project entailed collection of refuse 
from individual homes and businesses, clearing of rubble and refuse dumps in open 
spaces, debushing of trees in the immediate outskirts except those ‘of natural ornament 
and wind breaking’ qualities and development of parks (Claim from N.N. Doubada to 
TLC, 26.4.1997: 3). It should be noted that the debushing of trees and removal of rubble 
and other forms of dirt from open spaces are not provided in Chapter 13 of the Code; 
hence the majority of our towns and cities are dirty. Upgrading of parks and debushing of 
trees in the outskirts turned open spaces into a user-friendly environment as opposed to 
being hideouts for criminals. Further, the Clean and Green Campaign project contributed 
to poverty alleviation, albeit for a short period, in that ‘twenty jobs were created out of 
which three supervisors earned R900.00 and [seventeen] labourers R700.00 per month 
for the period April 1997 – April 1998’ (Ibid: 5). 
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The problem is that the principles of Clean and Green Campaign project were abandoned 
with effect from May 1998 due to the appointment of refuse removal contractors along 
the old lines of a refuse removal tender which concentrated mainly on collection of refuse 
from individual homes and businesses by the Department of Local Government and 
Traditional Affairs. Attempts by the TLC to incorporate the concept of Clean and Green 
Campaign were met with resistance from the Departmental officials who were 
responsible for procurement of waste management services.  This prompted unemployed 
volunteers to organise themselves into Boikarabelo (take the responsibility) Club to fill 
the void by cleaning open spaces and developing parks.  The TLC provided this clean and 
green movement with working tools. 
 
The problem with the TLC was that it was reluctant to accommodate Boikarabelo Club 
volunteers in terms of payment or compensation for keeping the township tidy and 
developing parks for recreation purposes. The reason for failure of the TLC to 
accommodate these volunteers as far as payment is concerned can be ascribed to lack of 
willingness on the part of the TLC and the local branches of SANCO the ANC. This was 
because they suspected that the Boikarabelo Club was ‘influenced by opposition parties 
for political gains’ (ANC BEC Minutes, 3.10.2000: 3). The local branches of SANCO 
and the ANC as well as the TLC were antagonised by close leanings the Boikarabelo 
Club had with their rival, the LCO. It was only after tremendous pressure was brought to 
bear by the Boikarabelo Club that the TLC decided to give the said volunteers a once-off 
payment of R15 000 in September 2000 (ANC BEC Minutes, 3.10.2000). This shows 
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that meaningful community participation in community projects can only occur in an 
environment where the representative structures of dwellers put their interests first lest 
they risk to be rejected by the authorities or their interests will become subsumed under 
the interests of the opposition.  
 
4.3.5 Other Social amenities and community facilities 
The local branch of SANCO made efforts ‘to get a Community Resource Centre 
consisting of SANCO offices, a community hall, a conference room, counselling rooms 
for victims of violence, rape, HIV, etc, career guidance rooms and a mini library’ 
(SANCO Application/Request for Donation and/Financial Assistance, Undated: 2). These 
efforts were stalled by shortage of funds. Provision of multi-purpose centres such as the 
aborted one as envisaged by the local branch of SANCO in Lebowakgomo is not 
provided under chapter 13 of the Code. However, the TLC managed to strike an accord 
with Telkom for the installation of land lines in Units R and S Phase II and III with a 
view ‘to make telephones accessible to all residents in November 1997’ (TLC Notice to 
All Residents of Ward 3, 6.11.1997: 1). In addition, an agreement was struck with the 
Postmaster of Chuenespoort Post Office who also happened to be an executive committee 
member of the local branch of SANCO at the time, to grant residents of Units R and S 
Phase II and III as well as Lafata primary and Kopano secondary schools postal lobby 
boxes so that they could access their posts. Chapter 13 of the Code ignores the question 
of extending telecommunication services to informal settlements. 
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4.4 Social services  
The Civic Movement approach on social services centred on public schools, library, 
hospital and clinic as well as emergency services to which I turn below. 
 
4.4.1 Public schools and library 
Plans to erect state-of-the-art double storey school buildings for Lafata Primary and 
Kopano Secondary schools were scuppered by the take-over of the Homeland 
government of Lebowa by the central government Task Team that was led by Fourie in 
the latter part of 1993 (Department of Education and LCA Minutes, 13.5.1994). The 
envisaged state-of-the-art double storey school buildings for the two schools consisted of 
two blocks of eight classrooms, administration block, ablution block, laboratory, school 
hall, library, tennis court and sport field for various sporting codes per school. The school 
building structures and related amenities were budgeted to the tune of ‘± R8 million and 
this amount was to be covered by 1993/94 school backlog programme’ (Ibid: 1). 
Unfortunately, the school backlog programme for 1993/94 financial year was ‘exhausted 
by the Task Team (Fourie) on salaries’ (Ibid: 2).  The Civic Movement tried in vain to 
lobby the new government to adopt the said school design concept which could have set 
the tone for future provision of user-friendly schools. Had this concept been accepted, the 
Civic Movement could have arranged with the two schools that residents access social 
amenities of the two schools as was the case with an undeveloped sports field at Kopano 
Secondary School and a school hall at Little Bedfordview Primary School in Unit A (See 
“Sisco” Sehlapelo, Interview, 1.8.2008). The important concept of state-of-the-art schools 
comprising the aforementioned social amenities and “community facilities” as 
 84
conceptualised in the Civic Movement approach is neglected in the provisions of Chapter 
13 of the Code. 
 
The local branch of SANCO vigorously advocated for the establishment of a library 
within the informal settlements of Units R and S Phase II and III through its secretariat 
and Chairperson who was also the Chairperson of the TLC and Councillor for Ward 3. As 
a result, the TLC approved and budgeted for a new community library during 1999/2000 
financial year. Due to insufficient funds, the first phase of the new library consisting of 
the book area, children’s library, group activity room, store room, kitchen and ablution 
facilities was constructed. The second phase of the library which covers the study area, 
reception, book repair store, offices, workspace and another store room still remains to be 
embarked upon. This community library was located approximately 2km from the new 
Lebowakgomo Hospital next to Unit R and 3.5km from Unit R Clinic and the two 
schools.  
 
The idea behind the location of the library was to make the library ‘accessible for 
pedestrians, cars, wheelchairs (users), bicycles, etc’ and to reduce the distance between 
this educational facility and the two health service facilities (which I discuss below) 
(TLC Report on Lebowakgomo Library, Undated: 3). It was also envisaged that users 
who may for one reason or the other feel a headache or get sick or injured while studying 
at the library could access medical services nearby. The location of the public Library in 
close proximity to the informal settlements of Units R and S Phase II and III was crucial 
for the creation of an atmosphere conducive for studying, enhancement of at-home study 
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and the development of human capital. The location of the library within walking 
distance from the informal settlements, schools and health facilities is also promoted 
under Chapter 13 of the Code. 
 
4.4.2 Health care and emergency services 
Following an agreement reached after a defiant protest march on 2 February 1993, the 
former Lebowa Department of Health, Social Welfare and Pensions was forced to 
arrange for provision of clinic services at the building structure earmarked for a clinic in 
Unit R (SANCO Secretariat Report, March 1994). The arrangement for the operation of 
this structure as a primary health facility was a sequel to the agreement that the police 
would vacate the building earmarked for a clinic in Unit R ‘to make way for provision of 
health services’ (Agreement entered into between the Minister of Health, Social Welfare 
and Pensions and LCA, 17.3.1993).  This served as a relief to residents of the informal 
settlements of Units R and S Phase II and III because they no longer had to travel for 
12km to access primary health services at Lebowakgomo parliamentary complex. This 
was complemented by the introduction of mobile clinic services through active guidance 
of the TLC at the beginning of 1996 (TLC Report on Three Years of Local Government 
Administration 1.11.1995-1.11.1998: 3). The introduction of mobile clinic services also 
enhanced primary health services for informal settlement dwellers. 
 
In line with its vision for transformation of Lebowakgomo into a fully-fledged town, the 
SANCO-inspired TLC lobbied the Department of Health and Welfare for the erection of 
a hospital to provide tertiary health services in Lebowakgomo. The efforts of the TLC 
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paid dividends through the resolution for decommissioning of Dr MMM Hospital and 
establishment of Lebowakgomo and Zebediela Hospitals during the latter part of 1996 on 
the part of the Department. SANCO leaders within the TLC lobbied vigorously for the 
hospital to be built next to Unit R ‘on approximately 50 hectares [of land] on the farm 
Voorspoed 449, Registration Division K.S.’ along the main road from Unit A to Unit F 
(TLC Report on Proposed Regional Hospital, 23.7.1996: 1). The purpose of this location 
was ‘to make [health] services accessible to all residents’ of Greater Lebowakgomo, 
especially those from the informal settlements of Units R and S Phase II and III (Ibid). 
The idea was that informal settlement dwellers could access tertiary health services from 
within walking distance as is also currently conceived in Chapter 13 of the Code. 
 
In summary, the establishment of Unit R clinic and Lebowakgomo Hospital, installation 
of community lighting as well as cleaning and debushing of open spaces and 
development of parks were in line with Chapter 13 of the Code’s conception that health 
and safety ‘builds human capital by enhancing the productivity of labour and reducing 
vulnerability to disease’ (Department of Housing, 2004b: 5). This conception was 
complemented by the establishment of Lebowakgomo Library nearby. The idea behind 
the location of health facilities within walking distance from the informal settlements of 
Units R and S Phase II and III was to enable the poor to use non-motorised transport to 
access these facilities (“Weso” Doubada, Interview, 1.8.2008). Poor households could, 
for example, utilise wheelbarrows to ferry patients to the nearby hospital in case of 
sudden illnesses (Ibid).  
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From September 1995, the local branch of SANCO campaigned for provision of 
emergency services through protest marches. These efforts were supplemented by 
submission of motions by its Chairperson in his capacity as the TLC Rep in the NDC. 
The issue of making the fire station that was located in Unit IA operational was 
vigorously raised by the TLC Rep in the NDC (who was also the Chairperson of the local 
branch of SANCO) through submission of written motions. As a result, the budget was 
allocated by the NDC during 1996/97 financial year for the purpose of making the fire 
station operational (Report on Assets, April 1996). Upon investigations, it was discovered 
that the budget that was required for repairs of the fire station building far exceeded that 
of constructing a new structure altogether due to damages caused by the occupation of the 
station by the army. For this reason, the desire for emergency services by the community 
was only realised with the construction of a new fire station adjacent to the Civic Centre 
by the TLC and NDC successors in title, Lepelle-Nkumpi Local Municipality and 
Capricorn District Municipality (CDM) respectively in 2004.  This fire station is located 
approximately 8km from the informal settlements of Units R and S Phase II and III which 
meant a reduction of 12km from the old unused fire station in unit IA.  Of importance is 
that the new Fire Station incorporated fire fighting, Jaws of Life and human resuscitation 
services which were important to prevent loss of property and human life. 
 
4.5 Housing 
Most informal settlement dwellers of Unit R and S Phase II and III had already 
constructed their own houses by the time 1 000 consolidation and 1 000 project-linked 
subsidies were allocated for Units R and S Phase II and III in 1996 (TLC Progress Report 
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for Ward 3, November 1995 – September 1998).  The fact that both Units R and S Phase 
II and III had already benefited from engineering services in 1993 meant that only R7 
500 per beneficiary was available for top structures pertaining to consolidation subsidies 
(Ibid). Due to low profit margins associated with construction of Reconstruction and 
Development Programme (RDP) houses, the appointed construction company, Comdev, 
felt that it was going to run at a loss were it to construct 36m2 RDP houses for R7 500 per 
site or beneficiary as per the contract.  Although the housing finance regulations did not 
provide for it, building materials were purchased for beneficiaries based on their 
preferences for incremental housing given the fact that most beneficiaries had already 
built their own houses. This arrangement was arrived at through the insistence of the 
local branch SANCO and the TLC. This innovation is absent from the provisions of 
Chapter 13 of the Code. However, Chapter 13 of the Code provides for community inputs 
in the house designs during Phase 4 of the Programme to allow for various housing 
typologies. 
 
The Civic Movement approach not only helped increase the living space of 421 
beneficiaries in Units R and S Phase II and III but also afforded them housing of their 
choice and thereby broke away from the “one size fits all” mentality, i.e., construction of 
an ocean of standard RDP houses characterised by a similar shape and small living space 
(See “Appendix D”). It also prevented fraud and/or abuse of R7 500 consolidation 
subsidies for other household items such as food, transport, clothing, education, etc., at 
the expense of household accommodation. 
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It was only after those who qualified for consolidation subsidies claimed their building 
materials that an application was made to convert the remaining 579 consolidation 
subsidies into the project-linked housing subsidies by Comdev (TLC Hand-Over Report 
to Lepelle-Nkumpi Municipality, 2000). Due to pressure from the TLC and the local 
branch of SANCO, this conversion was approved ‘subject to the Joint Venture agreement 
and a 50/50 professional team between the established and emerging companies’; hence 
Mokibelo Kgathi of Mokibelo Properties from unit A was roped in as a Joint Venture 
(JV) partner with Comdev (Approval Letter from Department of Housing and Water 
Affairs, 26.11.1996: 1). An agreement was reached with Mokibelo Properties/Comdev JV 
that the JV would contribute R20 per completed RDP house ‘to enable SANCO to carry 
out its day to day business’ and two show houses as a way of ploughing back to the 
community (SANCO Secretariat Report, 14.11. 1999 to 30.6. 2001: 6). This was a good 
way to enhance meaningful community participation. 
 
In order to address the problem of escalating material costs that were not catered for by 
the R15 000 subsidy quantum that remained the same for quite sometime, the JV was 
allowed to construct shells and leave out demarcation of rooms on 36m2 RDP top 
structures. The result of this arrangement was that more power was given to households 
to design their room sizes based on individual preferences. This deviation from the “one 
size fits all” mentality pertaining to demarcation of rooms for RDP houses also yielded 
rooms of various typologies and sizes, albeit this occurred at a cost to the beneficiary. 
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Preference for the allocation of project-linked subsidies was given to Unlawful Occupiers 
from Helen Joseph in Unit BA and those from Unit R as well as applicants on a waiting 
list (TLC Hand-Over Report to Lepelle-Nkumpi Municipality, 2000). For example, of the 
44 Unlawful Occupiers from Helen Joseph, 42 were relocated to Unit R while 2 were 
relocated to Unit S Phase III (Helen Joseph Relocation List, Undated). However, those 
relocated were not provided with relocation funding for food and transport as is currently 
incorporated in Chapter 13 of the Code. It was only after Unlawful Occupiers were 
accommodated that new applicants from within and outside the township were 
considered. In summary, the two RDP housing projects, i.e., the consolidation and 
project-linked housing subsidies were ‘aimed at eradicating squatter [informal] 
settlements in Lebowakgomo and to provide the homeless with proper shelter’ as part of 
the TLC strategy to ensure a shack-free environment (TLC Progress Report for Ward 3, 
November 1995 – September 1998: 3).  
 
Further, beneficiaries who did not qualify for low-cost housing subsidies ‘managed to 
acquire [RDP] houses through fraudulent means’ due to lack of affordability for bonded 
houses that were available on the market, especially in Units B and F, and lack of access 
to housing finance (SANCO Secretariat Report, 14.11. 1999 to 30.6. 2001: 5). In 
addition, some of those who qualified did not occupy their RDP houses but resorted to 
‘renting them at a fee to the needy ones’ (Ibid). Furthermore, certain beneficiaries sold 
their RDP houses informally while others used them as business premises such as hair 
saloons (See “Appendix E”), driving schools, spaza shops, taverns, etc., (SANCO 
Secretariat Report, 14.11. 1999 to 30.6. 2001).  Those who rented or sold their RDP 
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houses confirm the view that households with rural ties most likely prefer to consolidate 
in rural areas as opposed to urban areas.  Their acquisition of RDP houses was probably 
influenced by lack of housing options such as rental and rural housing or the desire to 
stake out a living. 
 
Conclusion 
Similar to the current provisions of Chapter 13 of the Code, the Civic Movement 
approach to upgrading of informal settlements of Units R and S Phase II and III was 
holistic in form and character.  Thus, it preserved existing community networks and 
support structures as conceptualised in Chapter 13 of the Code. It also benefited all 
informal settlement dwellers including illegal immigrants except for provision of 
subsidies for RDP houses, the same way as is currently conceived concerning Phase 4 of 
Chapter 13 of the Code. Although they were excluded from the provision of RDP houses, 
illegal immigrants had access to private rental accommodation as provided by individual 
housing beneficiaries and other individual informal settlement dwellers with backyard 
rooms. This is an aspect that is ignored in Chapter 13 of the Code. 
 
As far as the issue of planning is concerned, provision of water was found to have failed 
to take into account the source of water supply, i.e., the Chuene dam.  Hence, the internal 
water reticulation system was not activated due to lack of water pressure.  Moreover, the 
oxidation pond system was found to be in a state of overflow.  These factors bring to the 
fore the probability that some infrastructure in municipalities might be found to be 
improperly planned and, therefore, existing infrastructure needs to be reviewed to take 
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account of increasing population as a result of birth and migration of people from rural 
areas to urban areas. This is an issue that is also not considered in Chapter 13 of the 
Code.  
 
The Civic Movement approach ensured that informal settlement dwellers had access to 
secure and upgradeable tenure, basic municipal engineering services, social amenities and 
services, community facilities as well as adequate housing.  Of importance is that social 
amenities and services as well as community facilities were located within walking 
distance from the informal settlements under discussion. The idea was to enable the poor 
to use non-motorised transport to access these facilities. The Civic Movement approach 
on these issues sits well with the provisions of Chapter 13 of the Code as outlined in 
Section 2.4 of this research report. 
 
Funding mechanisms of the Civic Movement approach resembled that contained in 
Chapter 13 of the Code except that it was disintegrated. The only thing that tied funding 
for upgrading of informal settlements of Units R and S Phase II and III together was the 
advocacy approach of the Civic Movement in Lebowakgomo. However, other aspects of 
Chapter 13 of the Code such as the provision of the community hall, community resource 
and day care centres, taxi rank and sports fields were not catered for. Lack of provision of 
these facilities meant deprivation in that provision of these facilities serves to enhance a 
sense of belonging and a shared community. 
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The Civic Movement approach further helped reduce criminal activities in the study area 
through community lighting, debushing in the outskirts of residential areas and 
development of parks. It also enhanced human capital through skills training and 
empowerment during the implementation of community-based projects. This helped 
reduce poverty and vulnerability.  It further encouraged the development of social capital 
through meaningful community participation.   
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Chapter 5 
Political Component of the Civic Movement approach 
5.1 Introduction 
Community participation mechanisms of the Civic Movement transcended engagement 
of the community through government created mechanisms. The Civic Movement 
approach involved the community in all aspects that affected their lives through the 
street, block and general mass meetings; and the All Structures meetings. These 
community participation mechanisms were translated into the TLC approach through the 
Masakhane Campaign.  However, political bickering that followed conflict over the form 
community participation needed to take generated seeds of conflict at the political level 
in Lebowakgomo. It also brought the alliance the local branch of SANCO had with that 
of the ANC and the issue of ‘double cap’ into question. Further, the Civic Movement 
approach of eradication of informal settlements prior to the formation of the LCO 
assumed the role of what Huchzermeyer (2008) refers to as ‘positive eradication’. This 
approach was carried forward by the local branch of SANCO and the TLC albeit with 
some aspects of what Huchzermeyer (2008) refers to as ‘negative eradication’ towards 
unlawful occupation of land as spearheaded by the LCO after its formation in April 1997. 
I will interrogate these issues under the concepts of community participation and 
eradication of informal settlements to which I turn below. 
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5.2 Community participation   
5.2.1 Street, block and general mass meetings and the Masakhane (let us build 
together) Campaign  
In 1996, street committees facilitated the naming of streets whereas block committees 
ensured that the informal settlement community renamed Units R and S Phase II and III 
Thabo Mbeki and Hillary Mahlatji sections respectively. Thabo Mbeki was the Deputy 
President of the Republic of South Africa whereas Hillary Mahlatji was an MK 
(Umkhonto We Sizwe) veteran who was residing in Unit B at the time. Street naming 
enhanced access to the localities by emergency and police vehicles as promoted under 
Chapter 13 of the Code. The renaming of Units R and S Phase II and III helped phase out 
the use of the name “Shushumela” (Invaded land) with its negative connotation of 
forceful occupation. 
 
General mass meetings organised by the local branch of SANCO were well attended 
probably because its Chairperson happened to be both Councillor for Ward 3 and 
Chairperson of the TLC (TLC Chairperson’s Address earmarked for Chairperson/Mayors 
for Masakhane, 28.6.1996). Therefore, the issue of ‘double cap’ serves as evidence that it 
is good strategy for the civic to be in government in order to be able to shape and 
implement the policies that will address the people’s needs. The inherent internal 
contradictions such as conflict over control of resources and competition for support of 
residents between councillors and civic leaders and among councillors were mitigated by 
the unity of purpose between and among the leaders of the civic and the local authorities. 
The fact that the local branch of SANCO used the language best understood by the 
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community, i.e., Northern Sotho together with respect for other people’s views and 
encouraged constructive debates also propelled members of the community to partake at 
all levels of community meetings. 
 
The issue of payment for arrears based on a flat rate and resumption of payment for rent 
and service charges was resolved by residents themselves through street, block and 
general mass meetings. This signifies the centrality of the community in advancing 
meaningful community participation on issues that affect their lives through the Civic 
Movement. In order to deepen the culture for payment of services, the TLC extended 
‘payment for water, Refuse Removal, General Service Charges and purchase instalments 
for sites’ to the informal settlements of Units R and S Phase II and III with effect from 
April 1996 (Ibid:6). Payment for refuse removal and general service charge was declared 
the same as that of formal residents of Units A, S Phase I, etc. These payments were 
discussed and ultimately endorsed at street, block and general mass meetings held under 
the auspices of the local branch of SANCO. It was at these meetings that more emphasis 
was placed on the significance of payment for services by the local leadership of SANCO 
and the TLC as well as residents themselves. In addition, informal settlements dwellers 
were ‘also urged to have sewerage connection in their stands so as to activate the 
sanitation system on sewerage reticulation which was provided in 1993’ (TLC Press 
Statement on Masakhane Campaign, 30.4.1996:2).  
 
All residents, formal inhabitants and informal settlement dwellers alike, were also urged 
through leaflets, pamphlets, electronic media such as radio and television, print media 
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such as local and national newspapers to be up to date with payment for services. The 
fact that funds were set aside for provision of domestic energy and community lighting, 
clinic, primary and secondary schools, etc., by the TLC as discussed in the previous 
chapter of this research report, went a long way in convincing the inhabitants of the 
informal settlements of Units R and S Phase II and III about the necessity for payment of 
services. 
 
Community-Based Public Works Programme (CBPWP) projects such as bulk water 
supply, wastewater treatment works, roads and stormwater drainage project, etc., 
empowered the local community through job creation, education and training. Skills 
development that was provided through CBPWP funding covered training in 
administrative, management, construction, and financial skills were developed in areas 
such as holding of regular meetings, drafting of agenda, minutes taking, purchasing and 
bookkeeping, collections of monthly payments, project selection as well as project and 
practical management (See Annexure G). Skills development in these areas was also vital 
in community participation pertaining to issues of the broader society. This form of 
public participation and empowerment transcends the current provisions of Chapter 13 of 
the Code. 
 
As a result of effective community participation and payment for and delivery of 
services, the TLC ‘was awarded the Masakhane Certificate of Excellence at a function 
held at the Union Buildings [in Pretoria] on the 28 June 1996’, as the provincial winner 
of Masakhane for the Northern Province (now Limpopo) (TLC Report on Masakhane, 
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14.11.1996: 1; also See “Appendix F”). It was at this function that ‘the other seven 
provincial winners in brackets were awarded the Masakhane Certificates of Excellence: 
Free State (Mokwallo, Fredefort), Gauteng (Lekoa/Vaal), Mpumalanga (Middleburg), 
Western Cape (Oordshoorn), North West (Bophirima District Council), Northern Cape 
(Keimoes) and Eastern Cape (Butterworth)’ (Ibid).  The ninth province, i.e., Kwazulu-
Natal was ‘excluded because it was still to hold the community elections when winners 
from provinces were announced’ (Letter from TLC Chairperson on the Selection 
Committee for Masakhane Awards, 4.11. 1996: 1). 
 
5.2.2 All Structures meetings 
It was through the All Structures meetings that the Civic Movement led a delegation 
consisting of hawkers trading at the main entrances to public institutions and at shopping 
centres and the taxi rank, street vendors, as well as spaza and shebeen owners to the local 
police station with a view to get the local police to refrain from harassing informal traders 
in 1994. The SANCO-led delegation of informal traders insisted that the police relax their 
application of trading laws so as to allow unencumbered ‘trading under the cloak of free 
enterprise’ (TLC Report on Assets, April 1996:14). As a result, informal traders in 
general were allowed to stake out a living without any police harassment based on 
enforcement of unpopular and outdated regulations. This serves as proof that informal 
settlement dwellers do not solely require their own organisations to advance their cause. 
 
On the question of community safety, the All Structures meetings gave rise to the 
formation of the Monitoring Forum between the Civic Movement and the local police 
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station with a view to conduct night patrols in the whole township to curb robbery and 
theft.  It was also through the All Structures meetings under the guidance of the local 
branch of SANCO that Lebowakgomo Interdenominational Ministries Association 
(LIMA) was charged with the responsibility to convoke crime prevention prayer services 
at the Roman Catholic Church and Lebowakgomo Taxi Rank in Unit A. The prayer 
convocation services were important in that they inculcated the spirit of togetherness and 
discouraged criminal elements from engaging themselves in criminal activities which 
were described by the church as the work of the devil.  This was one aspect of 
community participation that could draw informal settlement dwellers into meaningful 
participation in matters that threatened their lives and well being side by side with other 
residents as opposed to condemnation of informal settlements as havens of crime. 
 
The SANCO-inspired TLC adopted the model of the All Structures meetings during its 
compilation of the Land Development Objectives (LDOs) in the period 1997-1999. All 
Structures/Stakeholders across the socio-economic and political spectrum in the TLC area 
constituted the Public Participation Committee (PPC) under the chairpersonship of the 
TLC to address ‘issues related to land uses and control and integrated development 
planning’ (TLC Progress Report for Ward 3, November 1995 – November 1998: 4). The 
fact that SANCO leaders within the TLC were steeped in the modus operanti (workings) 
of the All Structures meetings means that they were able to advance the interests of all 
stakeholders irrespective of their ideological backgrounds. 
 
 100
As compared to the current IDP committees, the PPC was pragmatic with clear mandates 
that were readily accommodated by TLC leaders who were more experienced as far as 
stakeholder engagement was concerned. The problem with the current IDPs is that they 
are technocratic in approach in that they are driven by professional planners or 
consultants the majority of whom are still trapped in ‘a strongly traditional and spatially 
oriented practice of planning’ (Harrison, 2006: 196). Moreover, ‘the participatory 
element of the IDP mixes uneasily with a performance culture, driven by targets and time 
frames’ that is not responsive to the realities of public participation on the ground  ( Ibid: 
202). 
 
5.2.3 Tripartite Alliance Plus One and Ward Councillor meetings 
Jack Mamphuti Phala, the Secretary of the LCA who was elected in 1991 and Moses 
Mphahlele, who was an additional member of the LCA at the time, opposed the 
alignment of the Civic Movement to the Tripartite Alliance as early as 1993 (LCA 
Secretariat Report, March 1994). It should be noted that Phala and Mphahlele were local 
leaders of the local branches of the PAC and AZAPO respectively. Phala and Mphahlele 
insisted that it was inappropriate for SANCO to align with the ANC-led Tripartite 
Alliance because the Civic Movement consisted of members from different political 
shades. 
 
The opposition against the alignment of SANCO to the Tripartite Alliance by leaders of 
the local branches of the PAC and AZAPO support the commonly held view that the 
communities cannot effectively indulge themselves in constructive engagement in an 
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environment where the Civic Movement is aligned to some political organisation(s).  
This is true in as far as the academic debate is concerned. However, from the point of 
view of practical and effective community participation, the Civic Movement is best 
positioned to address the needs and aspirations of informal settlement dwellers and the 
broader community through street, block and general mass meetings as an ally of the 
Tripartite Alliance, provided it maintains its independence as is the case with the SACP 
and COSATU. The Alliance with the ANC-led Tripartite Alliance supplemented by mass 
action where appropriate certainly gave the local branch of SANCO a jumpstart over the 
rival LCO in addressing bread and butter issues of the informal settlement inhabitants of 
Units R and S Phase II and III. 
 
Political jockeying for power between the ANC and SANCO forced the former to 
reposition itself and assume the leadership of the Tripartite Alliance Plus One as 
entrusted to it (the ANC) by history (Joint ANC BECs Minutes, 07.03.96; also See 
“Weso” Doubada, Interview, 1.8.2008). To this end, the ANC identified a need to realign 
its branches into civic-oriented structures as early as March 1996 (“Weso” Doubada, 
Interview, 1.8.2008). The need was also identified ‘for close coordination between the 
BEC’s and Councillors, especially those who represented the wards within the boundaries 
of the existing branches’ as well as ‘constant feedback from the Councillors’ (Joint ANC 
BECs Minutes, 07.03.96: 6-7). It was also felt that Councillors should be accountable and 
responsible to the ANC and that the Councillor together with the BEC report to the 
general membership and the community through ANC branch and Ward Councillor 
meetings respectively (“Weso” Doubada, Interview, 1.8.2008).   
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For the above reasons, the Tripartite Alliance Plus One Lekgotla (Council) held on 9 May 
1997 resolved that the Ward Councillors should ‘together with the ANC, be accountable 
to the electorate in the form of ward meetings’ (Alliance Structures Bosberaad Notes, 
Undated: 1). This resolution contradicted SANCO’s approach that Ward Councillors 
report at community mass meetings held under its auspices whereby residents took part 
‘in SANCO activities at all levels – street, block and branch levels’, to tackle issues of the 
broader community within the wards (SANCO Chairperson’s Address to the AGM of 
SANCO, 14.11.1994: 4). The shift in ANC strategy was also precipitated by the fear, 
which emanated from calls on the part of some activists within the Civic Movement 
nationally and locally, that SANCO ought to be transformed into a political party Ibid. 
This made ANC politicians doubly anxious about their positions and careers and thus 
they began to mistrust SANCO. 
 
Political bickering within the Tripartite Alliance confirms the view that politicians use the 
system of participation to garner support for their organisations and to entrench 
themselves with a view to further their political careers.  It also shows that the ANC was 
politically sensitive to the dominant role of SANCO and thereby corroborates the view 
that politicians distrust community organisations. Further, the insistence that Ward 
Councillors be accountable to the electorate through Ward Councillor meetings by the 
local Lebowakgomo branch of the ANC served to steal the platform of meaningful 
community participation away from the local branch of SANCO and thereby, reduced its 
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base and weakened it further. It also served to slow down the tempo of community 
involvement and representation. 
 
However, the Alliance Lekgotla influenced the TLC to engage residents through 
participatory budget albeit at Ward Councillor meetings. This was a sequel to the 
resolution for ‘involvement of the people in drafting of people’s budget (participatory 
budget)’ as adopted by the Alliance Lekgotla on 9 May 1997. Henceforth, the TLC began 
to identify and prioritise community needs ‘through involvement of communities in the 
budgetary processes’ (Alliance Structures Bosberaad Notes, Undated: 1; also See Official 
Hand-Over of Completed Projects, 14.10.1996:1). Community participatory budget was 
based on the scoring system. The criteria for scoring revolved around issues of service 
type, participation, sustainability, job creation and capacity building (Scoring Table for 
Capital Projects, Undated). The fact that community participation was adopted as one of 
the ingredients for budgetary purposes propelled the local branch of SANCO in 
Lebowakgomo and the TLC to engage the community further in public participation.  
 
5.3 Eradication of informal settlements 
5.3.1 The formation of the LCO and unlawful occupation of Unit R 
The decision to abandon the right to joint allocation of sites with the Town Manager’s 
Office on the part of the local branch of SANCO after the community elections of 1995 
was informed by the need to promote orderly urbanisation. The aim was to curb the 
emergence of new informal settlements and thus attract investments in line with 
SANCO’s broader objective to develop Lebowakgomo into a fully-fledged town. This 
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decision left the gap concerning the emergence of informal settlements as a solution to 
address the rising demand of housing by the homeless and migrants from rural areas.  
This void was filled by the LCO which emerged as a rival to the LCA (the local branch of 
SANCO).  The LCO was formed by Jack Mamphuti Phala and Moss Mphahlele of the 
local branches of the PAC and AZAPO respectively on 6 April 1997.   
 
The reasons for the formation of the LCO were manifold. Chief among these reasons 
were the huge housing backlog for the homeless, dissatisfaction against the alliance 
SANCO had with the ANC as well as the question of ‘double cab’. The LCO leaders, 
notably Phala and Mphahlele, wanted separation of roles between SANCO and the TLC 
and that SANCO be independent from the ANC.  It was feared that SANCO could easily 
be associated with delivery of services as against the TLC as the local sphere of 
government by the community and thereby, boost the ANC during elections (See “Weso” 
Doubada, Interview, 1.8.2008). As a result, the LCO battled for turf with SANCO.   
 
In order to address the plight of the homeless and to dislodge SANCO from local politics, 
Phala and Mphahlele led the invasion of Unit R (in the morning) and the formation of the 
LCO (in the afternoon) on 6 April 1997 (Applicant’s Replying Affidavit, Case number 
15562/97). The majority of those people who were allocated sites were from the rural 
areas in search of economic and housing opportunities (“Weso” Doubada, Interview, 
1.8.2008). Phala and Mphahlele were elected Chairperson and Secretary of the LCO 
respectively, at its launching meeting. Given this state of affairs, it is safe to conclude that 
the occupation of land in Unit R was not spontaneous. Rather, it was carefully planned 
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and organised in order to get support for the establishment of the LCO for purposes of 
representing the interests of the homeless and to dislodge SANCO. It can also be argued 
that the formation of the LCO was not an initiative of Unlawful Occupiers but of 
outsiders much more so that both Phala and Mphahlele were residing in Unit A.  
Moreover, Victor Selapa, Ally “Madlisa” Mapheto and John Langa (now late) who were 
also elected into the executive committee of the LCO were inhabitants of the informal 
settlement of Unit S Phase II and III. 
 
Further, the LCO complained of the length of time the homeless took without being 
allocated sites, corruption in the allocation of sites, prejudice as a result of double 
allocation of sites in Unit R and that SANCO continued to allocate sites as opposed to the 
Town Manager’s Office (Applicant’s Replying Affidavit, Case number 15562/97). As for 
the complaint in relation to corruption, the LCO cited ‘certificates of completion of 
building in respect of the house build on unit “S” site 316 [Phase II] and in respect of site 
1321 unit “S” [Phase III] in the town Lebowakgomo’ that were issued by the building 
inspector of the Northern District Council (NDC) on 9th and 20th January 1997 
respectively (Ibid: 12). These certificates were issued for mere foundation trenches as a 
result of the building inspector of the NDC having relied on the unscrupulous local 
contractor’s word that individual subsidy houses were already constructed by him on the 
aforementioned sites. This revelation by the LCO confirms that the Civic Movement can 
effectively play the representative and watchdog roles on behalf of informal settlement 
dwellers. 
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5.3.2 Regularisation of Unit R as a means of ‘positive eradication’ of informal 
settlements 
Of the 210 households who were allocated sites in Unit R by SANCO in 1994, 166 were 
allowed to apply for deeds of grant upon payment of R195 deposit towards the purchase 
of their sites. The remaining 44 households were made to obtain legal ownership of their 
sites through transfer of deeds of grant from households who were allocated the same 
sites by the Town Manager during the collapse of the Implementation Forum in 1994.  
During March 1996, ‘the chairperson of the local branch of SANCO and the rural council 
of Greater Lebowakgomo, made an announcement that the people with problem of 
double allocation within unit “R” should come to the office of the Town Manager of 
Lebowakgomo and must come and make sure that their names are on the waiting list 
from which the allocation of the new serviced sites was to take place’ (Ibid: 8). 
 
Out of the 100 additional sites that were serviced in Unit R in 1996 for the purpose of 
resolving the problem of double allocation, preference was given to 44 ‘applicants who 
were the holders of deeds of grant in respect of sites in unit “R” that were occupied by 
people to whom SANCO had allocated such sites’ during 1994 (Ibid: 32).  ‘After having 
allocated sites to holders of deeds of grant who lost their sites due to SANCO’s action 
during 1993 [1994], the Town Manager during March 1996 started to allocate the 
remaining sites within unit “R” according to the waiting list of applicants in its office’ 
(Ibid: 33).  ‘The process through which legalisation of the occupation of sites within unit 
“R” took place was that the occupant of a site to which SANCO allocated to it [him or 
her] during 1993 [1994] had to obtain a letter of confirmation that the respective site had 
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been allocated to him or her during 1993 (1994) by SANCO and then had to pay the 
prescribed amount for the site to the Town Manager whereafter a deed of grant was 
issued’ (Ibid: 32). 
 
Further, as I have already pointed out in Chapter 4 of this research report, preference for 
allocation of RDP houses was given to Unlawful Occupiers from Unit R and Helen 
Joseph in Unit BA and applicants on a waiting list. Of Unlawful Occupiers in Unit R, 
some did not qualify for RDP houses either because they benefited elsewhere or were 
earning more than R3 500. Some of those who qualified but were reluctant to apply for 
RDP houses did not want to consolidate in urban areas because they preferred their rural 
villages (“Weso” Doubada, Interview: 1.8.2008). The TLC’s attempt to address the 
problem of Unlawful Occupiers through the Housing Subsidy Scheme (HSS) and the 
waiting list served to neglect the housing situation of the above categories of people.  
This approach can also be said to have been in contradiction to the provision of Chapter 
13 of the Code pertaining to engineering services for people who have either benefited 
from other areas or do not qualify for Phase 4 benefits of the upgrading process.  It also 
did not offer choices for those who preferred to consolidate in rural areas. 
 
Nevertheless, the TLC addressed the problem of people in desperate circumstances to a 
certain extent by giving preference to Unlawful Occupiers concerning allocation of RDP 
houses in Units R and S Phase III. The TLC could have done more in this regard should it 
not have allocated 56 remaining serviced sites in Unit R on the basis of a waiting list 
because such an approach neglects people in desperate circumstances. On the contrary, 
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the TLC should have given preference to those of the Unlawful Occupiers who neither 
qualified for RDP houses because they earned above the qualification limit nor prepared 
to consolidate in urban areas or those who had already benefited elsewhere. This is an 
aspect that is addressed under Phases 1 to 3 of chapter 13 of the Code. Had the TLC 
realised how significant the question of rural links is on home choice, it could have 
afforded households with rural ties the opportunity to opt for rural subsidies or 
institutional housing for purposes of rental accommodation. 
 
5.3.3 Application for court eviction and ‘negative eradication’ approach of SANCO-
inspired TLC  
In an endeavour to ensure the eradication of informal settlements and a shack-free 
environment, the TLC applied for a court order for eviction of the LCO-led Unlawful 
Occupiers from Unit R. This application was backed by the local branch of the ANC by 
way of despatching a letter to the TLC ‘emphasising its support for proper control of the 
allocation of sites’ (Ibid).  The LCO was defended by Advocate Louw who contended 
that the Unlawful Occupiers had immediate need for land or shelter and, therefore, 
‘should be allowed to continue to occupy land which they had invaded’ (Ibid: 42). The 
defence also argued that there was ‘lack of orderly administration of Lebowakgomo town 
since 1994’ (Ibid: 54), that the allocation of sites was done by SANCO as opposed to the 
Town Manager ‘without proper process of allocation or on the basis of friendship, family 
ties or payment of money’ (Ibid: 57). In addition, the defence contended that the low-cost 
housing development was ‘being done without proper plans being submitted to the town 
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manager and without proper inspection by the building inspectors of the Transitional 
Local Council’ (Ibid).  
 
The TLC argued to the contrary of the defence and asserted that the LCO ‘had no power 
to allocate sites’, that ‘illegal occupation of sites took place in an inorderly fashion, 
interfered with bulk services provided and took place on the boundary of sites’ (Ibid: 24), 
and that it was the LCO’s ‘action to invade and occupy the land without proper 
authorisation’ that would instead ‘interfere with the orderly administration of the 
Lebowakgomo Town’ (Ibid). In addition, the TLC submitted that it did ‘not make sense 
for homeless people to settle illegally on land which has been serviced and developed in 
order to provide housing to people who are homeless’ (Ibid:27). Further, the TLC insisted 
that illegal occupation interfered ‘with the process of orderly administration of 
government, the allocation of sites according to waiting lists’ and made ‘proper planning 
and orderly development impossible’ (Ibid:24).  This argument is not different from the 
conception of Chapter 13 of the Code that seeks proper planning and orderly 
development to be based on the Integrated Development Plan (IDP) of each municipality. 
 
During the day of the Supreme Court sitting over the application for eviction of Unlawful 
Occupiers from Unit R on 21 July 1997, Advocate Louw alluded to the fact that a 
precedent had been set through legal recognition of occupation of land by informal 
settlement dwellers who were led by SANCO to invade land in Unit S Phase II and III in 
1991 and Unit R in 1993. He also referred to ‘the provisions of Section 26 (3) of the 
Constitution which provides that no person shall be evicted from land unless all the 
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circumstances pertaining to their occupation have been taken into account’ (Judgement, 
Case number 15562/97: 3). Based on this constitutional provision, Advocate Louw 
exhorted Judge Daniels to consider such circumstances as advanced by the LCO defence.  
 
In his judgement on 22 July 1997, Justice Daniels pronounced that ‘the respondents do 
not claim a legal right, derived legally and officially to occupy the land in question, or to 
allow any person to occupy,’ that the respondents were ‘in illegal occupation of the land’, 
and that circumstances referred and alluded to Counsel ‘call for political rather than 
judicial intervention’ (Ibid: 3-4). He also added that the respondents had taken ‘the law 
into their hands, and in so doing invaded the land, and rendered the applicant’s efforts to 
administer the allocation of land almost impossible’, that they ‘one sidedly and single 
mindedly disrupted the orderly allocation of land and by adopting the illegal means they 
have created a situation which is untenable’ and that circumstances relied upon by them 
‘have mostly been created by themselves, and are certainly not circumstances to be taken 
into account’ (Ibid:4). 
 
For the above reasons, an order for eviction of Unlawful Occupiers from Unit R was 
granted with Kalkbult as an area of alternative accommodation. It should be noted that 
Kalkbult was situated approximately 20km away from the unlawful occupation of Unit R 
(See Annexure A: Map 2). In addition, the LCO leaders and Unlawful Occupiers were 
ordered to bear the costs of the court application jointly and severally. The TLC 
Chairperson summed up the negative eradication approach through his emphasis that the 
Supreme Court judgement ‘gave an indication that the days of illegal forceful occupation 
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of land by squatters [Unlawful 0ccupiers] will soon be over in Lebowakgomo’ in his 
interview with Phasha (Undated: 3) on the profile of the TLC Mayor. The judgement 
supported the move by the TLC and SANCO to ensure orderly urbanisation and 
eradication of illegal occupation of land.  It was also in line with international thinking 
and the current conception of Chapter 13 of the Code that evictions must be undertaken 
on the basis of a court order. 
 
It should further be noted that unlike the LCA before it, the LCO led land occupation on 
state land without permission from any government structure (Applicant’s Replying 
Affidavit, Case number 15562/97). As a result, its legal representative could not adduce 
any legal reasons to show that the Unlawful Occupiers were legally occupying the land 
(Ibid).  In my view, the LCO defence should have referred to the right to housing as 
enshrined in the South African constitution.  In terms of section 
 
   ‘26 (1) Everyone has the right to adequate housing.  
      (2) The state must take reasonable legislative and  
               other measures, within its available resources, to  
               achieve the progressive realisation of this right’.  
               (Republic of South Africa, 1996: 12). 
 
As Budlender (2003: 6) correctly puts it, ‘the right to housing (like all other social and 
economic rights) is a factor which has to be taken into account, with due weight, in all 
administrative decisions which bear the realisation of the right’. In addition, the state has 
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the duty to respect the right to housing. This ‘requires the state to refrain from interfering 
with the enjoyment of the right’ (Ibid). However, it should be borne in mind that the case 
of the unlawful occupation of Unit R occurred before the landmark Grootboom ruling in 
the Constitutional Court (ConCourt) in 2000 when the right to housing was given more 
detailed meaning. 
 
The omission on the part of the LCO defence to cite the constitutional right to housing 
means that the application for court eviction of Unlawful Occupiers from Unit R was 
adjudicated without reference to Section 26 (1) and (2) of the Constitution. Secondly, the 
LCO defence failed to maintain that ‘the squatters [Unlawful Occupiers] were entitled to 
protection from eviction’ under the Prevention of Illegal Eviction (PIE) Act because they 
were living in desperate circumstances.  In addition, the LCO defence did not contest the 
validity of the use of the waiting list for people in desperate circumstances as the 
Unlawful Occupiers under discussion.  Moreover, it did not argue that no provision was 
made in the TLC or government ‘housing policy for people in crisis situation the 
squatters [Unlawful Occupiers] found themselves’ (COHRE, 2005: 27-8).  Further, it did 
not exploit provisions of the Development Facilitation Act (DFA) which entitled 
Unlawful Occupiers to be relocated in a way that accommodates their interests in the land 
and homes they already occupied. 
 
Although ‘Kalkbult 169 K.S. adjacent to the rural settlement Lekušwaneng’ was cited as 
an area of alternative accommodation by the TLC, the area was not provided with tents, 
portable latrines and communal taps to ensure proper water supply and sanitation along 
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the lines of Phase 1 of Chapter 13 of the Code (Applicant’s Replying Affidavit, Case 
number 15562/97: 60). What the TLC merely did was to clear the area for occupation and 
dig seven trenches for pit latrines for approximately 400 households that were expected 
to relocate to Kalkbult. This contradicts the TLC Chairperson’s argument as contained in 
Phasha (Undated: 3) that the TLC felt that it could “not just throw people away without 
giving them alternative accommodation to settle on”. Had the LCO leaders and their 
defence done their homework, they could have challenged Kalkbult as an area of 
alternative accommodation on the grounds of lack of temporary communal water taps and 
ablution facilities and its close proximity to the sewerage pond. These factors posed 
health risk to human habitation at Kalkbult. In fact, the question of heath hazard could 
have necessitated a further relocation from the area as is currently provided in Chapter 13 
of the Code. In addition, the LCO leaders and their defence could have noticed that 
although it was situated in close proximity to places of economic opportunities such as 
Unit IA, Kalkbult was not well-located to social opportunities such as shops, schools and 
places of worship as well as sports fields as is currently provided in Chapter 13 of the 
Code. 
 
Further, the LCO leadership and its defence failed to notice that the development of low-
cost houses in Unit R was not going to affect Unit R Extension 2.  As a result, they failed 
to indicate Unit R Extension 2 as a suitable remedy available to the TLC ‘to solve the 
problem of the illegal occupation of state land in the Lebowakgomo town’ (Ibid: 61). In 
addition, they failed to supply particulars of any people who were in dire need of 
accommodation next to the existing unlawful occupation of Unit R for the purpose that 
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alternative accommodation could be provided in close proximity to the area of 
occupation. All the aforementioned factors should have been raised as relevant 
circumstances that needed to be considered by the Supreme Court in terms of Section 26 
(c) of the South African Constitution. Surely, their case could have been strengthened had 
the LCO leadership and its defence done their homework properly and adduced all these 
factors as relevant circumstances for consideration by the Supreme Court. Nevertheless, 
on the flip side of the coin, planned unlawful occupation of Unit R made the TLC aware 
through the application for court eviction of Unlawful Occupiers from Unit R that certain 
residential areas such as Units R, S, Q, P, F and E were never ‘formally proclaimed in the 
Gazette as part of the Lebowakgomo town’ (Ibid: 27). Unit R, for example, ‘was 
identified and approved to be incorporated into the town of Lebowakgomo in 1987’ but 
the process was not carried to its logical conclusion (Ibid).  The TLC took advantage of 
the need to close any loopholes pertaining to the application for court eviction of 
Unlawful Occupiers from Unit R through an immediate proclamation of outstanding units 
and other surveyed farms on 17 June 1997 (Applicant’s Replying Affidavit, Case number 
15562/97; also See Annexure G). 
 
On the day of eviction of Unlawful Occupiers from Unit R through the court order, the 
LCO leadership tried to negotiate with the TLC Chairperson on the eviction site to have 
Kalkbult replaced as an area of alternative accommodation. To this end, they proposed 
unit J, open space next to Unit S Phase II and the area next to Lebowakgomo showground 
as preferred alternative relocation areas. They felt that any one of the three areas was 
suitable as an alternative to Kalkbult because of their close proximity to the area of 
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eviction. They cited proximity to schools in Unit S, the clinic in Unit R and the nearby 
hospital for health services, sports fields, church services as well as the shopping and 
undeveloped taxi rank in Unit A. The request by the LCO was in line with the conception 
of Chapter 13 of the Code that emphasises ‘minimum disruption or distortion of existing 
fragile community networks and support structures’ (Department of Housing, 2004b: 6).  
It was also in line with the provision of Chapter 13 of the Code that ‘the relocation must 
take place at a location as close as possible to the existing settlement and within the 
context of an approved community relocation strategy’ (Ibid: 19).  The fact that the TLC 
made no provision for transportation and loading costs for structures as well as relocation 
food support for Unlawful Occupiers contradicts the current provisions of Chapter 13 of 
the Code on relocation. 
 
The TLC rejected the proposed relocation alternatives and insisted that any deviation 
from Kalkbult as an area of alternative accommodation would contradict the court order 
at a meeting held a day after the LCO’s request. As I have earlier highlighted, the issues 
around an alternative relocation place should have been raised as relevant circumstances 
that needed to be taken into account by the Supreme Court on the part of the LCO and its 
defence. The TLC’s rejection of alternative areas of relocation as proposed by the leaders 
of Unlawful Occupiers as well as the strict application of the court order means that 
relocation was not undertaken ‘in a voluntary and negotiated manner’ as envisaged in 
Chapter 13 of the Code (Ibid: 20). Following the rejection of the LCO’s alternative areas 
of relocation, the Unlawful Occupiers relocated themselves to the open space next to Unit 
S Phase II to the west of Unit S Phase I.  After they stayed for two months in this area, 
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the Unlawful Occupiers relocated to Unit R Extension 2 on their own accord.  This was 
probably after they observed that the area was not going to be affected by low-cost 
houses that were being constructed in Unit R.  The relocation of Unlawful Occupiers to 
Unit R Extension 2 means that, as against the current provisions of Chapter 13 of the 
Code, no mechanisms were devised by the TLC ‘to ensure that the land [of relocation] is 
not re-occupied’ (Ibid). 
 
Faced with re-occupation of land by Unlawful Occupiers in Unit R, ‘the TLC distributed 
questionnaires to squatters [Unlawful Occupiers] at Unit R (Extension 2) and the 
information regarding their names, ID numbers, previous residence etc was gathered’ 
(TLC Minutes, 9.9.1999: 6). An ‘inspection was also conducted where illegal water 
connection’ was effected (Ibid).  ‘A meeting with their steering committee was also 
arranged for 19 August 1999’ but representatives of Unlawful Occupiers boycotted it 
‘due to their reluctance to meet with officials regarding their removal and re-allocation to 
another place’ (Ibid). These efforts by the SANCO-inspired TLC were not carried out 
with the interest of Unlawful Occupiers at heart but to build a case for another application 
for court order which was subsequently obtained by the TLC successor in title, i.e., 
Lepelle-Nkumpi Municipality in 2002. The TLC efforts, therefore, were geared towards 
what Huchzermeyer (2008) refers to as the ‘negative eradication’ of informal settlements. 
 
Conclusion 
The case of the Civic Movement in Lebowakgomo has proved that participatory 
mechanisms as adopted by the local branch of SANCO can serve to frustrate the top-
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down approach of the local authorities. Although they were not necessarily designed for 
the informal settlements of Units R and S Phase II and III, community participation 
mechanisms as adopted by the local branch of SANCO and the TLC proved effective in 
ensuring meaningful community involvement in matters that affected the lives of 
informal settlement dwellers. Moreover, these mechanisms can be replicated at scale at 
any informal settlements in South Africa. They can also be used to compliment those that 
are contained in Chapter 13 of the Code. Further, the local branch of SANCO was able to 
synergise its community participation approach with that of the TLC through leveraging 
the influence of its leaders who were deployed into the TLC.  Community participation 
mechanisms of the Civic Movement involved every member of the community with 
powers to make decisions as opposed to stakeholders as provided in the current Ward 
Committee system. In addition, these mechanisms did not require participants to 
commute to meeting places because they were applied within easy reach of the 
community unlike the current Ward Committee system with vast distances between 
residential areas. Further, participation based on stakeholder representation occurred 
through active engagement of stakeholders with clear mandates and decision-making 
powers unlike the Ward Committee system wherein participants serve in an advisory 
capacity without powers to execute their resolutions. Moreover, the community 
participation approach of the Civic Movement empowered residents of Lebowakgomo in 
general, the informal settlement inhabitants of Units R and S Phase II and III in 
particular, to actively partake not only in projects from conception to inception but also in 
every facet of their lives. 
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With regards to the question of eradication of informal settlements, the Civic Movement 
promoted ‘positive eradication’ from its inception in 1990. This can be ascribed to the 
fact that the leaders of the Civic Movement propagated for tenure security, provision of 
engineering services, social amenities and services as well as community facilities in 
Units R and S Phase II and III along the lines of the current provisions of Chapter 13 of 
the Code. In order to regulate the formation of new informal settlements, the Civic 
Movement abrogated its right to joint allocation of sites with the local authorities to the 
TLC immediately after its leaders were ushered into the TLC through community 
elections of November 1995. However, the rising demand for housing led to the 
emergence of the LCO, a rival civic organisation to the local branch of SANCO, which 
coordinated the invasion of land in Unit R. Henceforth, the local branch of SANCO and 
the TLC adopted the ‘negative eradication’ approach towards the unlawful occupation of 
Unit R. SANCO and the TLC missed the opportunity to regularise the unlawful 
occupation of Unit R by supporters of the LCO by insisting on accommodating the 
interests of Unlawful Occupiers through provision of RDP houses in a greenfield 
development nearby.  
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Chapter 6 
Conclusion and recommendations 
6.1 Introduction 
The Civic Movement approach illuminates lessons which municipalities can draw from 
to sharpen their strategies regarding upgrading and ultimate eradication of informal 
settlements.  These lessons (to which I turn below) hinge on the concepts of urban/rural 
linkages, secure tenure, community participation and eradication of informal settlements. 
I will start my discussion of these lessons with the conclusion of this study from which I 
will formulate possible recommendations for a viable informal settlement intervention. 
 
In summary, provision of secure tenure, social amenities and community facilities, social 
services and housing through the advocacy approach of the Civic Movement uplifted the 
standard of living of the informal settlement dwellers. It also contributed to poverty 
reduction of the physical environment and the inhabitants of the informal settlements 
under discussion. As to how poverty reduction of the inhabitants was effected will be 
subjected to scrutiny below given the fact that poverty reduction of the physical 
environment has been explored above. 
 
6.2 Conclusion 
Although most of the dwellers originated from rural areas, the Civic Movement and the 
TLC never conceptualised the impact rural ties have on tenure choice in urban areas.  
Hence, no efforts were made to accommodate the interests of people with rural 
connections in the informal settlements that constitute the case study of this research 
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report. This was aggravated by the fact that prior to the year 2000, the national housing 
policy was skewed towards the urban areas, townships in particular. This factor coupled 
with lack of rental accommodation in urban areas precipitated migrants from rural areas 
to enrol for RDP houses en masse only to sell them informally and revert to informal 
areas because they did not prefer to consolidate in urban areas. This was a subtle way to 
bring the urban biasness of the national housing policy into question.   
 
This case study of Lebowakgomo has also shown that community participation as 
espoused by the local branch of SANCO was not tokenistic in form or project based but 
went beyond mere consultation and encompassed every facet of life.  The nature of 
decision-making was characterised by a bottom-up as opposed to a top-down approach of 
the government authorities. Further, the local branch of SANCO in Lebowakgomo did 
not owe its strength to any form of funding from the state but to community members 
themselves. Hence, unlike its mother body at national level, the local branch of SANCO 
was not affected by the drying-up of donor funding after the democratic elections of April 
1994. This dispels the notion that donor or government funding is necessary to empower 
residents pertaining to issues of participatory planning and development as contemplated 
in Chapter 13 of the Code.  
 
The alignment of SANCO to the Tripartite Alliance generated a lot of opposition from 
the local branches of the PAC and AZAPO in Lebowakgomo and resulted in the 
formation of the LCO which became an arch rival of the local branch of SANCO.  The 
battle for turf between the LCO and the local branch of SANCO did not auger well for 
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the unison advancement of the needs of informal settlement dwellers.  However, on the 
flipside of the coin, the alliance SANCO had with the ANC-led Tripartite Alliance gave it 
a jumpstart to advance the cause of informal settlement dwellers through its leaders who 
were elected into the TLC on an ANC ticket.  It was through access to positions of power 
and resources in the TLC that the local branch of SANCO improved the informal 
dwellers’ lot.  
 
Although the local branch of SANCO represented the needs of the broader society, 
informal settlement inhabitants influenced it to take specific actions on issues that had a 
direct bearing on their well being. This category of residents only formed their own 
organisation, the Concerned Action Committee, (which they dissolved after the resolution 
of the electricity crisis) to address specific issues of a project nature when they felt that 
their interests were being threatened under the leadership of the local branch of SANCO. 
Had they relied on their strength or committee alone, they could have missed the 
opportunity to leverage the power of the local branch of SANCO as well as solidarity 
from the broader community. This serves as evidence that a committee appointed by 
informal settlement dwellers only becomes relevant to address specific issues of a project 
nature and that such a committee needs to maintain its independence and resist any 
attempts to being hijacked for petty political interests and closing shop upon fulfilment of 
its mandate. It should be noted that informal settlement inhabitants do not live in an 
island to be represented by their own organisations or committees as opposed to the Civic 
Movement. Therefore, any view that propagates for participation through committees 
elected by and accountable to informal settlement dwellers with indirect inputs from the 
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broader community within which informal settlements are located will only serve to 
perpetuate social exclusion and to deprive dwellers of the opportunity to leverage the 
power of the Civic Movement and to access solidarity of residents beyond the informal 
settlements. 
 
Conflict over the electricity design as spearheaded by the Concerned Action Committee 
serves to enlighten us to the significance of community involvement on the development 
design in the conception stage of any projects.  In addition, the fact that the beneficiaries 
were allocated building materials of their own choice through the consolidation subsidy 
scheme and were given the opportunity to design their own rooms through the project-
linked housing subsidy scheme means that the community was empowered to design 
houses of their own tastes.  This approach enhanced human creativity and ushered in 
houses varying in typology and size, an ingredient that is promoted under Chapter 13 of 
the Code. Hence, the informal settlements of Unit S Phase II and III and part of Unit R do 
not conform to the view that capital subsidy houses are characterised by rows of “one 
size fits all” matchbox houses. This approach can be replicated in any upgrading projects 
and beyond. 
 
Security of tenure was ensured through provision of a wide range of tenure choice from 
access to land without any form of titling to land titles in the form of deeds of grant. 
Provision of different forms of tenure is also promoted under Chapter 13 of the Code. 
However, like full titling as suggested as one form of tenure in Chapter 13 of the Code, 
titling in the form of deeds of grant tied residents into an economic burden of payment of 
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rates and service charges. However, the allocation of serviced sites outside the capital 
subsidy scheme by the TLC was biased in favour of the poor in line with the current 
provisions of Chapter 13 of the Code. In addition, households who could not afford to 
raise down payment towards purchasing of their sites could still enjoy secure tenure for 
the rest of their lives or up to a point where they decided to put their properties on sale. 
However, such households were deprived of services such as dustbins and refuse 
removal.  This form of deprivation also meant that these households were freed from the 
cycle of payment for services which is tied to titling.  
 
Further, households who managed to afford down payment and monthly purchase 
instalments were exonerated from payment of interest. In addition, the payment period 
was user-friendly to the poor because it was spread over a period of 30 years. Such an 
approach freed poor households from volatile interest rates. It should be noted that, more 
often than not, volatile interest rates leads to dispossession of properties and thereby, 
drive the poor into informality. Therefore, the view that mortgage loans are an 
inappropriate form of housing finance for the poor holds water. By not levying interest on 
purchase instalments for sites and spreading the payment period over a period of 30 
years, the advocacy approach of the local branch of SANCO in Lebowakgomo ensured 
that sites were made affordable to the poor. However, titling in itself attracted service 
charges without any attempt by the SANCO-inspired TLC to subsidise poor households 
up to adequate and acceptable levels of consumption. 
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The allocation of sites based on the system of the waiting list blurred both the SANCO-
inspired TLC and the local branch of SANCO itself from considering people in desperate 
circumstances. Qualifying beneficiaries who preferred to consolidate in rural areas 
acquired RDP houses for purposes of pursuing other opportunities such as employment, 
rental income, better education, or to realise liquid value through informal sales. This 
issue has become a thorn in the flesh of local authorities because they neither recognise 
the livelihoods of the poor nor comprehend the significance rural ties have on tenure 
choice in urban areas. This issue is also ignored in Chapter 13 of the Code. 
 
The issue of wearing two hats on the part of SANCO leaders set the tongues wagging 
over the effectiveness of utilising community leaders deployed in government structures 
to advance community interests while they still retained their positions in the Civic 
Movement. This is the issue that needs further research. The case of Lebowakgomo has 
already set the tone for this debate by serving as evidence that the question of ‘double 
cap’ generates a lot of benefits for the community in general, inhabitants of informal 
settlements in particular. The fact that the local branch of SANCO in Lebowakgomo 
effectively utilised its leaders deployed in the TLC, NDC and PHB who also retained 
their positions in the Civic Movement to advance its cause and to immensely improve the 
lives of informal settlement dwellers attest to this point. 
 
The formation of the opposition LCO was not only legitimate but also had its advantages 
in that it deepened participatory democracy, forced the SANCO-inspired TLC to give 
preference to Unlawful Occupiers regarding the allocation of RDP houses and to 
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proclaim areas of Lebowakgomo that were not yet proclaimed, and brought corruption in 
respect of construction of RDP houses to the fore. These factors point to the usefulness 
for residents of having a variety of strategies in their relationship with power be it co-
operational or confrontational. They also corroborate the view that the Civic Movement 
is best positioned to play both representative and watchdog roles as opposed to a 
committee elected by and accountable to dwellers only. 
 
Concerning the question of the right to housing, the LCO leaders failed to stick to 
constitutional provisions and other legislation in their opposition against the application 
for court eviction of Unlawful Occupiers from Unit R. Leaders of the LCO also failed to 
challenge Kalkbult as an area of alternative accommodation despite the fact that they had 
convincing reasons at their disposal which they advanced to the TLC long after the 
Supreme Court ruling for eviction. Although the court eviction led to the downfall and 
collapse of the LCO, the Unlawful Occupiers relocated to the area of their own choice 
closer to Unit R as opposed to the far away official relocation area of Kalkbult 
characterised by bad odour and infested with mosquitoes from the nearby sewerage pond. 
This was made possible by the fact that the SANCO inspired-TLC failed to take 
precautionary measures to prevent the formation of new settlements as conceptualised in 
Chapter 13 of the Code. This omission is clear indication that ‘positive eradication’ of 
informal settlements cannot be realised without deliberate measures to do away with the 
conditions that lead to land invasions. 
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Relocation to the far away area of Kalkbult meant additional commuting costs for 
schooling, shopping and church activities because such activities were carried out within 
walking distance from Unit R. Therefore, the defiant move to an area of own choice on 
the part of Unlawful Occupiers under the leadership of the LCO helped preserve 
community networks. It also ensured that Unlawful Occupiers stayed in close proximity 
to social amenities and community facilities as well as social services and economic 
opportunities on the same footing with residents of Units R and S Phase II and III. The 
other problem with the SANCO-inspired TLC is its failure to provide relocation costs 
such as transport, loading and food support as is currently promoted under Chapter 13 of 
the Code. It also failed to provide temporary shelter as well as water and ablution 
facilities at the relocation area of Kalkbult as catered for in Chapter 13 of the Code. In 
summary, the approach of SANCO-inspired TLC on relocation to Kalkbult was in 
conflict with the current provisions of Chapter 13 of the Code. Further, the invasion of 
the land earmarked for RDP houses in Unit R is a microcosm of illegal occupation of 
shelter meant for the homeless by other homeless people in South Africa.  In most cases, 
this leaves the local authorities with a dilemma as to who should be accommodated or left 
out between the desperate illegal occupier and legal owner.  As was the case with the 
SANCO-inspired TLC in Lebowakgomo, local authorities tend to resort to forceful 
evictions by means of a court order, an aspect that is also promoted under Chapter 13 of 
the Code. 
 
With regards to the problem of crime, the inhabitants of the informal settlements of Units 
R and S Phase II and III were involved in crime prevention on the same footing with 
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other residents through night patrols and prayer convocation gatherings. This changed the 
face of seeing informal settlements as havens of crime but as combatants against criminal 
activities. Provision of community lighting also enhanced efforts at crime prevention.  
 
Further, participation in the compilation of the LDOs through the PPC was different from 
the current IDPs because inputs from stakeholders were not subjected to prioritisation 
based on technocratic means as is the case with the current IDPs. In addition, 
participation was facilitated by SANCO-Council representatives with experience on 
stakeholder involvement amassed through the All Structures meetings as run by the local 
branch of SANCO in Lebowakgomo. Moreover, community participation was not based 
solely on the ward system but encompassed various mechanisms of participation. The 
lessons raised above lay the basis from which governments at local, national and 
international level can chart a possible way forward regarding successful implementation 
of upgrading projects which can be adapted to local conditions, contexts and needs. It is 
to the recommendations emanating from these lessons complimented by national and 
international literature that I now turn. 
 
6.3 Recommendations 
Given budget constraints and the fact that the rate of urbanisation far outstrips provision 
of housing by municipalities, the formation of new informal settlements must be tolerated 
and guided through pro-active planning. This can be done through a massive land 
acquisition programme with clear targets to provide land and occupancy rights that can 
be upgraded on a progressive basis depending on the needs of individual households in a 
 128
greenfield development area. Government subsidies must be used outside of capital 
housing subsidies to fund the cost of land and infrastructure as is provided in Chapter 13 
of the Code. In order to address the demand and supply equation, prime land for 
residential development must be purchased at cost with expropriation as a last resort. The 
process of transferring land in the hands of government paratatals to municipalities for 
free as contemplated in Chapter 13 of the Code should be expedited through the 
designation and declaration of such land for affordable residential development. 
 
Titling programmes should be based on upgrading of tenure on a progressive basis from 
simple land occupancy rights to full title. The choice on the type of tenure should depend 
on the affected households. The simple land occupancy rights should be protected against 
forced evictions. In fact, a moratorium should be declared on all evictions except for 
settlements with scientific proof of health risk which cannot be rehabilitated. However, 
any relocation based on health risk should only be effected once engineering services 
along Phase 1 of the provisions of Chapter 13 of the Code have been installed. This 
should be coupled with provision of satellite schools, clinics and police stations and 
regravelled bus and taxi routes to reduce vulnerability of the poor and enhance access. 
This will pressurise municipalities to resort to relocations as a last resort. Tents should 
also be phased out for relocation purposes and be replaced with proper structures that can 
be dismantled with ease whenever the need arises because they are not fit for human 
habitation but for leisure. Further, the establishment of permanent schools must be 
packaged to cover building structures, ablution facilities, well equipped libraries and 
laboratories, computer facilities, sports fields for various sporting codes as well as the 
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school halls. These facilities should be opened for members of the public after school 
hours and during weekends and school holidays in informal settlements where such 
community facilities do not exist so that dwellers can develop a sense of belonging and 
ownership. 
 
A massive programme for land acquisition and provision of land occupancy rights in 
greenfield areas should be coupled with another massive programme for provision of 
engineering services, social and economic amenities as well as top structures based on a 
well calculated phased-in municipal development plan. The envisaged phased-in 
development plans must be crafted by the Civic Movement with active community 
engagement of other Community-Based Organisations (CBOs) along the lines of the All 
Structures meetings. The National Department of Housing must set and enforce annual 
affordable goals based on the proposed phased-in development plans as initiated by the 
Civic Movement in collaboration with other CBOs. However, municipal by-laws should 
be tightened and strictly enforced to prevent the formation of informal settlements outside 
the proposed development plans as shaped by the Civic Movement to prevent politicians 
from organising invasions for their narrow political interests. At the same time, massive 
development of greenfield areas alongside massive upgrading of existing informal 
settlements should be accelerated to enhance the phasing out, or put bluntly, the 
eradication of informal settlements. 
 
Upon completion of the installation of basic services in greenfield development areas, 
households in desperate need of shelter should be allowed to construct any form of 
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shelter according to their means while awaiting other phases of development within given 
phased-in development plans and budget constraints. Poor households with own plans 
and means such as access to family support and loans from social clubs and friends 
should be allowed incremental improvement of their shelter over time free from 
application of building norms and standards.  Such households should be reimbursed for 
expenses incurred on a scale equivalent to the subsidy quantum as early as the 
commencement of Phase 4 of the upgrading process. This will help them in their 
repayment of interest free loans or improvement of their existing houses or to meet other 
household expenses such as food, education, clothing, transport and furniture. It will also 
serve to incentivise poor households to invest in their starter houses for purposes of 
ensuring a shack free environment.  
 
Households who prefer to use their own housing plans/designs during Phase 4 of the 
upgrading process should be allowed to use capital subsidies to purchase materials of 
their choice to ensure houses of various typologies and sizes. Further, in order to promote 
provision of affordable rental accommodation, informal rentals in backyard rooms need 
to be recognised and subsidised by the local authorities. This will help discourage 
informal landlords from the use of shacks as opposed to properly constructed rooms for 
purposes of rental accommodation, and thereby avoid the development of unsafe and 
unhealthy conditions. Local authorities also need to tighten regulations pertaining to 
rental payments and to set rental ceiling to protect tenants against grossly overpriced 
rentals and forced evictions. 
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Furthermore, serviced sites should be availed to poor households for free and at cost to 
those who can afford such as the moderate income households. Measures must also be 
adopted to expropriate unoccupied sites at cost and to allocate such sites to the needy for 
free. Down payment towards the purchase of sites by the moderate and high income 
households should depend on the means of an individual household as defined by the 
household concerned. In addition, purchase instalments should be spread over a period of 
30 years without any form of interest levied on monthly repayments. This will help 
increase affordability levels. The allocation of sites and housing should also be made a 
joint affair between the Civic Movement and the municipalities to curb nepotism and 
corruption. The allocation criteria can be based on the waiting list along the lines of the 
proposed phased-in development plans on the proviso that people in desperate 
circumstances are guaranteed first preference on an urgent basis as and when they come 
to the fore or the need arises. A contingency budget should be compiled for this purpose.  
The community must also be given an opportunity to input on the allocation criteria for 
purposes of reviews. 
 
Households who prefer to consolidate in rural areas must be given an opportunity to opt 
for rural housing subsidies while retaining access to interest-free residential sites or 
subsidised rental accommodation in urban areas. This will help reduce commute costs for 
households who regard informal settlements as dormitory towns. This needs to be 
coupled with an integrated and affordable transport system. Municipalities are best 
positioned to contribute in this regard through reduction of a greater percentage of 
destinations to shorter distances that can be managed by bicycle and foot.  This requires 
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expansion of the bicycle and foot networks on internal streets and provincial roads.  This 
calls for partnership between municipalities and provincial departments of transport on 
the one hand, and municipalities and the NGOs and industry on the other, to promote 
bicycle and foot traffic. Of importance is that cycling and walking are economical, safe 
and contribute to good health. The extensive use of bicycle and foot traffic will contribute 
to poverty reduction through job creation. Further, the taxi industry should be heavily 
subsidised to lower transport costs since taxis are able to reach most destinations within 
the informal settlements. 
 
The block committees accountable to the block communities concerned under the 
leadership of the Civic Movement can best serve the function of existing Community 
Development Workers (CDWs). It is ideal that these committees be coordinated by the 
Civic Movement with direct contact to the three spheres of government in order to keep 
the authorities on their toes. The existing CDWs need to be phased out because they tend 
to owe their allegiance to politicians as opposed to the communities that they are serving 
as a means to consolidate their positions and to advance their careers. The ward 
committee system also needs to be jettisoned in favour of the block committee system 
because of its distorted powers and the abnormal distance between settlements within 
wards. The process of identifying informal settlements for purposes of upgrading should 
be left in the hands of the affected inhabitants under the leadership of the Civic 
Movement in collaboration with other CBOs and should be detached from IDP processes. 
Otherwise attempts to upgrade informal settlements through a revamped principle 
approach of Chapter 13 of the Code will remain a pipe dream. This approach also calls 
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for good coordination between and among various government departments and the three 
spheres of government to promote cooperative governance with a view to synergise 
planning and budgets on a consistent basis. The Masakhane campaign also needs to be 
revived and made the major component of community participation with community 
engagement, consumer education, upgrading of informal settlements, shack-free 
environment, service delivery, an efficient block system, poverty reduction and zero-
tolerance to roll over of funds as tools for monitoring and evaluation of the impact 
community participation makes on the lives of dwellers. 
 
The introduction of greening of open spaces such as parks and road reserves along the 
lines of the Clean and Green Campaign project and advanced wastewater treatment plants 
is also vital. These kinds of projects will help transform open spaces into user-friendly 
environments, create poverty reduction opportunities for the local residents and to reduce 
poverty of the physical environment. A community park including a kids section with 
entertainment facilities needs to be provided to strengthen the spirit of communalism. In 
addition, households with rural connections can benefit immensely through allocation of 
plots and supply of compost, seeds and cultivating implements for urban agriculture on 
the part of local authorities. 
 
All that I have recommended can be replicated with ease and success in every locality. 
Therefore, community participation should not only find conscious expression in all the 
programmes and policies of government but should also be lived in practice by 
politicians and government officials with active participation of dwellers under the 
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leadership of the Civic Movement. It is of no use to lament the failure by the 
municipalities to create such conditions because dwellers themselves need to impose 
themselves on decision-making processes that affect their well being. 
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Appendix A: Maps 1-5  
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Appendix B     Lebowakgomo 1:100 000 Map showing proclaimed areas of the Township as of 1972 
and 1976  
Source: Provincial Gazette Extraordinary, 17 June 1997 
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Appendix C Advantages/Disadvantages of Deeds of Grant and Full Title  
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Source: Greater Lebowakgomo TLC 
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Appendix D Photograph illustrating capital subsidy houses of different typology and size, 
whereby beneficiaries were permitted to purchase building materials of their choice. 
Source: Titus Rampeka Mpye, House No. 263, Peter Mokaba Street, Unit S Phase II, 
Lebowakgomo 
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Appendix E Photograph illustrating RDP houses that are used for Business purposes, Monterl 
Classiques Hair Salon, House No. 467, Unit R, Lebowakgomo 
Source: Sèan Moganedi, House No. 467, Unit R, Lebowakgomo 
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Appendix F The Masakhane Certificate of Excellence Awarded to Greater Lebowakgomo TLC 
at the Union Buildings in Pretoria on 28 June 1996 
Source: Greater Lebowakgomo TLC 
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Appendix G Proclamation of surveyed farms and units of Lebowakgomo, 17 June 1997 
Source: Provincial Gazette Extraordinary, 17 June 1997 
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Appendix H Skills Development Certificate Awarded to Mr. Sebutsoeledi Simon   
Mengwai as part of Community Empowerment Training through RDP/CBP Projects 
Source: S.S. Mengwai, 817 Unit A, Lebowakgomo 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 166
 
 
 
 
  
 
  
 
 
 
Chapter 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Greater Lebowakgomo TLC 
Appendix I Information Dissemination Audio Cassette produced by Greater Lebowakgomo TLC in 
collaboration with the Joint Center for Political and Economic Studies 
